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What’s Wrong with this Picture?  
When the Lanham Act Clashes with 
Artistic Expression 
Tara J. Goldsmith* 
 
  A century or so ago, Paul Cezanne reached into a fruit 
basket and said, ‘With this apple, I will astonish Paris.’  So 
he did.  He painted a picture of that apple so magnificent 
that it takes the breath away.  If he tried that today, he’d 
probably have the apple growers suing him for royalties.  
Sillier things have happened.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Photographer Chuck Gentile took another bite at the 
proverbial apple when he attempted to astonish Cleveland, a 
city, unlike Paris, not particularly renowned for its artistic 
achievement.  Gentile photographed a downtown museum 
against a Lake Erie sunset, made it into a poster, entitled it 
“THE ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM 
IN CLEVELAND,” and offered it for sale throughout the 
metropolitan Cleveland area.2  The Rock & Roll Hall of Fame 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law.  I would like to 
thank Professor William Treanor for his encouragement and support, and my 
family for their love.  A previous version of this Comment received second place 
in the 1997 Judge Conner Writing Competition, awarded annually by the New 
York Intellectual Property Association for the paper judged best on the subject of 
intellectual property law. 
1. Dan Lynch, Artist a Loser at the Track, TIMES UNION (Alb.), July 28, 1996, at 
B1. 
2. Rock & Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 934 F. 
Supp. 868 (N.D. Ohio 1996). 
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and Museum (“Museum”), however, was less than thrilled; 
it sought to enjoin all publication and distribution of Gen-
tile’s poster on the grounds that it violated the Museum’s 
trademark rights in both the building and the name, “ROCK 
AND ROLL HALL OF FAME.”3  To Gentile, the idea that the 
Museum would sue him over an artistic photograph seemed 
like the work of the “over-thirty crowd,” so mistrusted dur-
ing the 1960s.4  Gentile asserted that he did not need the Mu-
seum’s permission to sell the posters because the building is 
in a public place.5 
Unfortunately for Gentile, the United Stated District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio disagreed.6  In Rock 
and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Productions,7 
the court enjoined Gentile from selling and distributing his 
poster,8 finding a “likelihood of confusion”9 between Gen-
 
3. Michael Norman, Rock Hall Sues Over Unlicensed Pictures, PLAIN DEALER, 
May 1, 1996, at 3B. 
4. Robyn Meredith, Rock Hall of Fame Asserts Ownership of Image, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 1996, at 12A (referring to the “over-30 crowd” and its pro-war, anti-drug 
advocacy). 
5. Michael Norman, Rights to Image of Rock Hall at Stake, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 
21, 1996, at 9K. 
6. Rock & Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 873. 
7. 934 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Ohio 1996). 
8. Id. at 873. 
9. Id.  It is well settled that the crucial issue in an action for trademark in-
fringement or unfair competition is whether there is a likelihood that an appre-
ciable number of ordinary prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed 
simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.  See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1114(1)(a) (providing remedies for use in commerce of “any reproduction, coun-
terfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or 
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive”), 1125(a) (defining “likelihood of confusion”) (West Supp. 1996); 3 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 23:1 (4th ed. 1996); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 
7.03[B][2] (3d ed. 1995); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 
47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your 
Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1956).  For an in-depth treatment 
of the principles of likelihood of confusion in trademark law, see generally 
RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW (1995); 
MCCARTHY, supra, § 23. 
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tile’s poster and the Museum’s trademark that, the court de-
cided, would cause irreparable damage to the Museum’s li-
censing program and revenues.10  After reading the decision, 
Gentile remarked, “I think Jerry Garcia would be rolling 
over in his grave.”11 
The Rock and Roll controversy centered around the level 
of First Amendment protection that should be afforded by 
the fair use exception to artistic interpretation of a trade-
mark.  A trademark is any word, symbol, or device em-
ployed by a manufacturer or a merchant to identify his 
goods and to distinguish them from those of another.12  
Trademarks serve to help consumers identify the products 
they wish to purchase.13  Accordingly, trademark law his-
torically has focused on protecting consumers from confu-
sion due to false or misleading marks.14  The law thus pro-
 
10. Rock & Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 873. 
11. Robyn Meredith, Rock Hall of Fame Asserts Ownership of Image, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 1996, at 12A (referring to the late lead guitarist for the Grateful Dead). 
12. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 1996); see also Towers v. Advent Soft-
ware, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Design Look Inc., 693 F. 
Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Diane M. Reed, Use of “Like/Love” Slogans in 
Advertising:  Is the Trademark Owner Protected?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101 (1989) 
(citing Willis, The Life and Death of a Trademark, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
TRADEMARK LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 7 (1988)). 
13. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 636 
(1st Cir. 1992).  See Filippo M. Cinotti, fair use of Comparative Advertising Under the 
1995 Federal Dilution Act, 37 IDEA 133, 133 (1996); Howard Gensler, Property Law 
as an Optimal Economic Foundation, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 76 (1995); Patricia K. 
Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value of a Trademark Sys-
tem, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297, 298 (1982); cf. Gregory W. Hotaling, Ideal Standard 
v. IHT:  In the European Union, Must a Company Surrender Its National Trademark 
Rights When It Assigns Its Trademark?, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1178, 1248 (1996) 
(explaining that patents and copyrights protect unique characteristics, but do not 
supply a communicative element and thus consumers do not rely on a patent or 
copyright to identify a product’s quality in the same way they rely on a trade-
mark). 
14. See S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274 (providing that the goal of federal trademark law, as set 
forth in the Lanham Act, Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 
427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West Supp. 1996)), is “to 
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a 
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it 
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hibits a free rider from using another’s trademark to deceive 
consumers about the source and quality of the advertised 
product.15 
Many courts and commentators have noted that trade-
mark law inherently conflicts with principles of the First 
Amendment.16  Often, artistic expression requires the use of 
symbols and images otherwise protected by trademark 
law.17  This conflict of interests pits the rights of the artist in 
creating works against those of the trademark owner in hav-
ing exclusive control over its valuable marks.  In certain cir-
cumstances, courts have sided with the First Amendment, 
citing the overriding importance of free speech and free ex-
pression of ideas.18  From this jurisprudence has evolved a 
                                                                                                                                  
asks for and wants to get”). 
15. See Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862 (1992); Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut 
Co., 305 F.2d 916, 920 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Reed, supra note 12, at 101. 
16. See, e.g., George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment and 
the Artist—Part I, R.I. B.J., Mar. 1996, at 7 (“An artist’s freedom to use [icons from 
popular culture] against such legal protections ties into First Amendment con-
cerns.”); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody:  A Fair Use and First Amend-
ment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1094-96; Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Bal-
ance:  Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 122 
(1996); see also Russell A. Stamets, Ain’t Nothin’ Like the Real Thing, Baby:  The 
Right of Publicity and the Singing Voice, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 347 (1994) (criticizing 
the similar common law right of publicity as giving individuals too much protec-
tion for their voices). 
17. See infra notes 315-27 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of 
images in artistic expression). 
18. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Electronics America, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).  In White, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals highlighted scenarios in which he felt the First Amendment 
should prevail:  
Saddam Hussein wants to keep advertisers from using his picture in 
unflattering contexts.  Clint Eastwood doesn’t want tabloids to write 
about him.  Rudolf Valentino’s heirs want to control his film biography.  
The Girl Scouts don’t want their image soiled by association with cer-
tain activities.  George Lucas wants to keep Strategic Defense Initiative 
fans from calling it “Star Wars.”  Pepisco doesn’t want singers to use the 
word “Pepsi” in their songs.  Guy Lombardo wants an exclusive prop-
erty right to ads that show big bands playing on New Year’s Eve.  Uri 
Geller thinks he should be paid for ads showing psychics bending metal 
through telekinesis.  Paul Prudhomme, that household name, thinks the 
same about ads featuring corpulent bearded chefs.  And scads of copy-
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fair use exception to trademark law for some artistic inter-
pretation of a mark.19  This doctrine recognizes that where 
the use of the trademark is not as a source identifier, it is a 
fair one to which the trademark laws simply do not apply.20 
In holding that the Museum’s design is a protectable 
trademark and that Gentile’s poster infringed upon the Mu-
seum’s rights in that trademark, the court has put significant 
First Amendment rights at stake.  Indeed, the Rock and Roll 
decision stands as persuasive authority against unauthor-
ized photographs or other artistic interpretation of any fa-
mous building in the United States.  This decision will inevi-
tably rob the public of its enjoyment of a wide diversity of 
images and limit free expression of artistic works.21 
This Comment argues that the Rock and Roll decision 
overly extends the protection offered to trademark owners 
and confers an unwarranted monopoly that will negatively 
impact society.  Part I briefly introduces trademark and First 
Amendment law.  Part II discusses the facts of Rock and Roll 
and the district court’s decision to grant the preliminary in-
junction.  Part III argues that the district court incorrectly de-
cided Rock and Roll and proposes that works of art that con-
tain trademarks or brand-names deserve protection as 
artistic expression and free speech under the First Amend-
ment.  Accordingly, this Comment concludes that the Rock 
and Roll decision should be reversed because it seriously im-
pairs an artist’s ability to freely express his ideas. 
                                                                                                                                  
right holders see purple when their creations are made fun of.  Some-
thing overy dangerous is going on here. 
Id. at 1512-13 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
19. Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4); 1 JEROME GILSON, 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 4.03[3][c][iv] (1997). 
20. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4). 
21. See Vetter & Roche, supra note 16, at 7 (“When artists create radical, pro-
vocative or challenging work, offended people will often use established laws 
and regulations to stifle its creation or suppress its expression.”). 
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I. TRADEMARK AND FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 
Federal trademark law traces its origins to 1870, when 
Congress passed the Act of July 8, 1870.22  While the Su-
preme Court eventually struck down that statute,23 subse-
quent legislation met with more success.24  This part dis-
cusses the principles of trademark law and the First 
Amendment.  First, this part discusses trademark law and 
policy.  Second, this part explains defenses to trademark in-
fringement, including fair use and the First Amendment.  
Finally, this part examines the overlapping law of the right 
to publicity. 
A. Trademark Law and Policy 
Intellectual property is the legal regime by which authors 
and inventors protect intellectual creations.25  The principal 
objective of intellectual property law is to grant a limited 
monopoly to the originator of information.26  Such monopo-
lies take the form of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.27  
 
22. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. 
23. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 86 (1879) (finding the Act of July 8 
unconstitutional because Congress based its authority to regulate trademarks on 
the Patent and Copyright Clause, but noting that Congress could have constitu-
tionally based its authority on the Commerce Clause). 
24. Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act:  A Retro-
spective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 63 (1996). 
25. Intellectual Property—Patent and Trade Dress Law—Tenth Circuit Applies 
“Significant Inventive Aspect” Test to Determine Whether Utility Patent Precludes 
Trade Dress Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (1996); David Friedman, Stan-
dards as Intellectual Property:  An Economic Approach, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1109 
(1994); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 291 
(1988).  For a comprehensive introduction to the field of intellectual property 
law, see FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND 
TRADEMARKS (2d ed. 1993). 
26. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974-76 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(discussing the role of monopolies in both patent and copyright law). 
27. Patent law deals with the concept of functional and design inventions, 
and grants monopolies in order to encourage investment in new technology and 
invention. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 6:7 (4th ed. 1996).  Copyright, unlike a patent, “gives no exclusive 
rights to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—
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While these legal instruments share the common thread of 
safe-guarding innovation, they differ in many important re-
spects; for example, whereas the proprietor of a patented in-
vention or a valid copyright may make a negative and 
merely prohibitive use of its monopoly, the owner of a 
trademark may not.28  This qualified protection of trade-
marks is designed to encourage creativity and fairness to the 
consuming public and to ensure commercial morality.29  
However, there is a growing concern that trademark law is 
being pushed beyond the boundaries of its intended pur-
pose, as well as those of common sense.30 
Since at least the middle ages, trademarks have served 
primarily to identify the source of goods and services and 
“to facilitate the tracing of ‘false’ or defective wares and the 
punishment of the offending craftsman.”31  Trademarks cur-
                                                                                                                                  
not to the idea itself.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).  In contrast to copyright 
and patent law, trademark law is not concerned with the content of words or the 
development of new technology, but rather with the protection of identifying 
symbols. See infra notes 31-34; see also American Footwear Corp. v. General 
Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980) 
(“Trademark rights, unlike statutory copyright or patents, are not rights in gross 
or at large.”). 
28. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918); see 
United States v. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897) (explaining that because the 
inventor is one who has discovered something of value it is his absolute property 
and he may withhold the knowledge of it from the public); Bement v. National 
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90 (1902) (“The full benefit of the discovery, after its en-
joyment by the discoverer for 14 years, is preserved; and for his exclusive enjoy-
ment of it during that time that public faith is pledged.”); see also Neal R. Platt, Is 
a Trademark Owner’s Right to Use its Mark Protected by the First Amendment?, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1294 (1983). 
29. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 98 (“[A trademark] is merely a convenient 
means for facilitating the protection of one’s good-will in trade by placing a dis-
tinguishing mark or symbol—a commercial signature—upon the merchandise or 
the package in which it is sold.”). 
30. Don Luce, Counterpoint . . . Chuck Gentile and the Rock and Roll Hall of 
Fame, ASMP BULL., Oct. 1996, at 9; see Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros., 252 
F.2d 945, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958) (“Under modern condi-
tions, with vastly increased means of communication and the use of advertising 
media of a far-reaching character, many recent cases have afforded the holder of 
a trademark protection.”); see, e.g., Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th 
Cir. 1948); Ambassador East v. Shelton Corners, 120 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
31. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 
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rently serve to differentiate brands from one another, allow-
ing a consumer who wishes to purchase a particular product 
the ability to identify successfully that brand when she so 
desires.32  If the consumer is satisfied with the product’s 
quality, she will continue to purchase that particular brand.33  
Thus, trademarks both encourage manufacturers to create 
quality products and reduce consumers’ costs for market 
searches by informing the public of a good’s source.34 
1. The Lanham Act 
Whereas patents and copyrights exist because of an ex-
press constitutional grant,35 trademarks do not enjoy such 
recognition.36  In fact, the Supreme Court expressly held that 
the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution does 
                                                                                                                                  
(9th Cir. 1992) (quoting F. SCHECTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 
RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 47 (1925)); see MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 5:1; Robert 
C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:  Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Ra-
tionales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WISCONSIN L. REV. 158, 160 (1982). 
32. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, §§ 2:5, 3:6; Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door 
Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 170 (7th Cir. 1996); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. 
Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1982), 463 U.S. 1208 (1983). 
33. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, §§ 2:5, 2:18; Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose 
Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862 (1992). 
34. United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 98; Kenner Parker Toys, 963 F.2d at 354.  Ac-
cording to two noted authorities in law and economics:  
In economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs by in-
forming people that trademarked products come from the same source.  
The benefit of the brand name is analogous to that of designating indi-
viduals by last as well as first names, so that, instead of having to say 
‘the Geoffrey who teaches constitutional law at the University of Chi-
cago Law School—not the one who teaches corporations,’ you can say 
‘Geoffrey Stone, not Geoffrey Miller.’ 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987). 
35. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“[C]ongress shall have Power . . . To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
36. Kenneth L. Port, Foreword:  Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory, 
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 594 (1993); see supra note 23 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the Supreme Court, in the Trade-Mark Cases, struck down Con-
gress’ first foray into federal trademark law, due to the lack of an express Consti-
tutional power). 
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not envision the protection of trademarks.37  Instead, trade-
mark protection is a common law concept which Congress 
codified in the Lanham Act.38 
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, 
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted 
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his 
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or 
sold by others.”39  The Lanham Act is premised on the rec-
ognition that when a party has expended resources to de-
velop an identification for its product, it is not equitable to 
allow another, who has made no such expenditure, to use 
the unique symbol and to trade on that party’s goodwill and 
reputation to promote his or her own goods or services.40 
 Accordingly, a trademark owner has the right to exclude 
others from using any mark when there is a likelihood of 
confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of goods or ser-
vices.41  Confusingly similar marks may cause consumers to 
 
37. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).  The Supreme Court justified 
this exclusion on the basis that trademarks do not “depend upon novelty, inven-
tion, discovery, or any work of the brain . . . . require[] no fancy or imagination, 
no genius, no laborious thought, . . . [but] simply founded on priority of appro-
priation.” Id.; Horowitz & Levi, supra note 24, at 60. 
38. Port, supra note 36, at 594. 
39. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West Supp. 1996)); see also Towers v. Ad-
vent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Design Look 
Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  Exclusive rights to a particular 
symbol or word adopted as a trademark belong to the entity that first uses the 
mark to identify and distinguish its product from the products of others. 
MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 16.1-.2. 
40. See, e.g., Frisch’s Restaurant v. Shoney’s Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir. 
1985); Federal-Mogul Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 
1963); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 
412-413 (1916); see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78,84 
(3d Cir. 1982); Dresser Indus. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 
461 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968). 
41. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114.  Specifically, the Act states:  
(1) Any person who shall, without consent of the registrant— 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or col-
orable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or ser-
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unwittingly purchase goods or services of a different or infe-
rior quality or reliability, thus depriving them of free choice, 
even when the goods or services are in fact of equal or supe-
rior quality.42  Thus, the important test is whether the defen-
dant’s practice is likely to cause confusion.43 
2. Trademark Protection of Buildings 
Trademark owners have invoked the Lanham Act to ob-
tain trademark protection for a variety of formats, including 
word marks,44 designs,45 colors,46 clothing,47 sounds,48 and 
                                                                                                                                  
vices on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a regis-
tered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-
orable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, recep-
tacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or 
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or adver-
tising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use 
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive shall 
be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinaf-
ter provided. 
Id.; see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924). 
42. See Truck Equip. Serv. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (finding a Lanham Act violation even though 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods were “of equal quality”); see also MCCARTHY, 
supra note 27, § 2:4 (explaining that trademark law embodies consumers’ expec-
tations of consistent quality “whether that quality is high, low or mediocre”); 
John C. Yates & Michael W. Mattox, Intellectual Property, 42 MERCER L. REV. 295, 
312 (1990). 
43. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that 
others can produce designs similar to the trademark so long as there is no likeli-
hood of consumer confusion); WCBV-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 
45 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The trademark statute does not give the appellants any ‘prop-
erty right’ in their mark except ‘the right to prevent confusion.’” (quoting Qua-
baug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1977))); Interna-
tional Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 
22, 35 (1st Cir. 1989) (“When the mark is used in such a way that does not de-
ceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used 
to tell the truth.”); Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 
F.2d 857, 861 (5th Cir. 1967) (“Confusion, or the likelihood of confusion . . . is the 
real test of trademark infringement.”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 23:1. 
44. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d 
Cir. 1976); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
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buildings.49  A building’s design functions as a mark when 
used to identify and distinguish the goods or services of the 
owner.50  For example, in White Tower System, Inc. v. White 
Castle System of Eating Houses Corp.,51 the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit found that a uniquely designed building 
could serve as a distinctive mark.52  The appellant, White 
Tower, used White Castle’s unique, castle-shaped ham-
burger stand as a model for its own design.53  When White 
Castle expanded its business to a locale near that of White 
Tower’s, White Tower demanded an injunction.54  The court 
found that the deliberate copying of the peculiar characteris-
tics of White Castle’s business precluded White Tower from 
obtaining an injunction under the doctrine of unfair competi-
tion.55  In fact, “the federal decisions generally hold that a 
junior user . . . will not only be refused relief, but will itself 
                                                                                                                                  
45. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. 
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 
(1989). 
46. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); In re 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
47. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Witchita 
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982). 
48. See, e.g., In re General Elec. Broadcasting Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560 
(T.T.A.B. 1978). 
49. See, e.g., Associated Hosts of California, Inc. v. Moss, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
973 (W.D.N.C. 1979); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).  
About 100 buildings are registered trademarks in the United States, including the 
Citicorp Center in Manhattan and San Francisco’s Transamerica tower. Bradford 
McKee, Architectural Trademarks, ARCHITECTURE, Feb. 1, 1997, at 148.  Most 
trademarked architecture, however, belongs to franchises, such as McDonald’s 
mansard roof; Pizza Hut’s colonnade, and Wendy’s yellow cornice. Id. 
50. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7:100-02; see, e.g., House of Hunan, Inc. v. 
Hunan at Pavilion, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 803 (D.D.C. 1985). 
51. 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937). 
52. Id. at 69; see, e.g., Fotomat Corp. v. Ace Corp., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 92 
(S.D. Cal. 1980) (finding that little film huts in parking lots rise to the level of an 
arbitrary and fanciful design). 
53. White Tower, 90 F.2d at 68. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 68-69.  Unfair competition is “a convenient name for the doctrine 
that no one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of another.”  Id. (citing 
Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924)). 
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be enjoined.”56 
Trademark protection for buildings, however, is not ab-
solute.  Specifically, courts have limited trademark protec-
tion to instances where the buildings themselves are part of 
a scheme and a competitor trades on the building design in 
an attempt to pawn off his products as those of another.57  
Trademark protection is thus limited to precluding another 
party from designing a building of the same shape.58 
3. Standard for Issuing a Preliminary Injunction 
A plaintiff initiating a trademark infringement suit will 
first file for a preliminary injunction.  In order to obtain a 
preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show:  (1) a rea-
sonable probability of success on the merits; (2) that it will 
suffer irreparable injury if relief is withheld; (3) that there 
will not be substantial harm to others if the injunction is 
granted; and (4) that the public interest would be served by 
issuing a preliminary injunction.59  While the application of 
these standards varies among the circuits, the two most im-
portant factors are irreparable harm and the likelihood of 
success on the merits.60  In trademark cases, these factors are 
generally satisfied by showing a likelihood of confusion.61 
In determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, 
 
56. Id. at 70 (citing Western Oil Refining Co. v. Jones, 27 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 
1928)). 
57. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992). 
58. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7:1000. 
59. Frisch’s Restaurant, 759 F.2d at 1263. 
60. DONALD S. CHISUM, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 
5F[3][a] (1995); see, e.g., Keds Corp. v. Renee Int’l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 
220 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining that, in a trademark case, “the key issue is the like-
lihood of success on the merits because the other decisions will flow from that 
ruling.”); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200 (2d 
Cir. 1979); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986); Cali-
fornia Cedar Prods. v. Pine Mountain Corp., 724 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1984). 
61. Id.; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114; see Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 
73 (2d Cir. 1988); Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 832 F.2d 
1311, 1314 (2d Cir. 1987). 
   
1997] WHAT’S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE? 833 
courts generally consider the factors enunciated in Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.62  These factors are:  (1) the 
strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the relatedness of the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s services; (3) the similarity of the 
marks; (4) the usages; (5) the marketing channels used; (6) 
the evidence of actual confusion; (7) the defendant’s good 
faith; (8) the likelihood of expansion of the product line us-
ing the mark; and (9) the sophistication of relevant buyers.63  
These nine factors “imply no mathematical precision, but are 
simply a guide to help determine whether confusion is 
likely.”64  Not all the factors are present or equally weighed 
in each case.65  In fact, the fact-finder is given latitude in con-
sidering and weighing the traditional factors.66 
 
62. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). 
63. Id. at 495.  The Second Circuit’s Polaroid decision influenced other cir-
cuits to adopt similar multiple factor tests for proving a likelihood of confusion.  
While the factors are generally the same, circuits vary as to the wording and 
number of factors.  See, e.g., Keds Corp. v. Renee Int’l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 
215, 222 (1st Cir. 1989); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 
1229 (3d Cir. 1978); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 
1984); Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, 78 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
64. Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 
1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991); see Jacqueline Pasquarella, Trademark Law—Confusion 
Over the Likelihood of Confusion?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1317, 1324 (1993) (discussing the 
conflict over the standard of review for determining likelihood of confusion); 
Patricia J. Kaeding, Clearly Erroneous Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact:  
The Likelihood of Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1291, 
1292 (1992) (arguing that likelihood of confusion is a mixed question of law and 
fact that should be treated as a factual issue for review purposes). 
65. Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., 30 F.3d 466, 476 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1994); see Pizzeria Uno Corp., 747 F.2d at 1527; Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Commu-
nity Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 345 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, 
Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
66. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Prudhomme, 765 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (N.D. 
Tex. 1991).  One court deployed the factors as follows:  
[T]he Court is of the view that certain of the Polaroid factors are proba-
tive of likelihood of confusion, others assist analysis of the balance of 
the equities, and still others serve to aid both inquiries.  The Court also 
believes that it is important, in making use of the various Polaroid fac-
tors, to consider not merely whether any particular factor is implicated in 
the case at hand, but the degree to which that factor is implicated. . . . 
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4. Trademark Dilution 
Dilution is a special kind of damage to a trademark that 
is different from trademark infringement.67  Dilution occurs 
when the distinctive quality of a mark is lessened by its use 
on a dissimilar product.68  For example, if the ROLLS 
ROYCE trademark were used with impunity by different 
companies on paper towels, wines, cat food and other prod-
ucts, the distinctiveness of the mark could become lessened 
and ultimately its scope of protection reduced.69  Unlike 
trademark infringement, trademark dilution can occur even 
in the absence of consumer confusion, when a mark is used 
                                                                                                                                  
[T]he fact that one or more of the Polaroid factors is not implicated by a 
given case does not determine the infringement issue, particularly if 
other of the Polaroid factors are strongly implicated by the situation pre-
sented.  At the same time, no single factor is a sufficient condition to 
finding infringement.  Rather, all the factors must be considered to-
gether according to the degree to which each is implicated by the case at 
hand. 
Lambda Elecs. Corp. v. Lambda Technology, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 915, 924-25 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
67. See Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infec-
tion which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of 
the mark.”); Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 
N.Y.2d 538, 543, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418, 422 (1977) (distinguishing dilution as 
“[n]ot public confusion caused by similar products or services sold by competi-
tors, but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds 
upon the business reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name.”). 
68. Allied Maintenance, 42 N.Y.2d at 544-46, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 422; see 
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 
825 (1927).  The definition of dilution is designed to encompass all forms of dilu-
tion recognized by the courts, including dilution by blurring and by tarnishment. 
Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983).  In contrast 
to dilution, “blurring” typically has involved the “whittling away of an estab-
lished trademark’s selling power and value through its unauthorized use by oth-
ers upon dissimilar products.” Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 
U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989).  Examples of this form of dilution 
would hypothetically include CANON pianos, MARS shoes, LISTERINE lip-
stick, and EDDIE BAUER cigars.  “Tarnishment” is another similar concept 
which arises when a famous trademark is linked to goods of poor quality, or is 
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering 
beliefs about the owner or its products. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 
F. Supp. 1183, 1191 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
69. 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE § 5.12[2]. 
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on unrelated goods.70  The damage is manifested not with 
confused customers, but rather “in the harm to the mark it-
self—to its uniqueness, to its singularity, to its capacity to 
identify the source of goods sold under it.”71 
Prior to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“Di-
lution Act”),72 dilution was actionable only under state law.73  
Whereas state dilution statutes typically protect “distinctive” 
marks, the federal statute applies only to “famous” marks—a 
 
70. See, e.g., Credit Counseling Ctrs. Am. v. Budget & Credit Counseling 
Servs., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2828, *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1997) (“The [anti-
dilution] statute prevents the unauthorized use of a name or mark which is iden-
tical to an established mark and precludes a party from using the established 
mark to attract new customers, even in the absence of consumer confusion or di-
rect competition.”); see also Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 
1995:  Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 121, 123 (1996).  The consumer may subliminally or subconsciously “identify 
the properties and reputation of one product with those of another, although he 
can identify the particular manufacturer of each.”  RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 1.4.D (1995).  Even if consumers 
do not consciously assume that the defendant’s product is somehow affiliated 
with the plaintiff’s product, there is the likelihood that consumers will be at-
tracted to the defendant’s product on the strength of the goodwill and positive 
image established by the plaintiff.  Stern’s Miracle-Gro Prods. v. Shark Prods., 
823 F. Supp. 1077, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
71. Prager, supra note 70, at 123.  When the public sees the same mark on 
different products, the advertising impact and value of the mark deteriorates, 
and the business reputation of the trademark owner may, through undesirable 
mental associations by consumers, become tarnished. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, 
§ 24:70. 
72. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1125(c), 1127). 
73. The Dilution Act adds a new definition to 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 for “dilu-
tion” as the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distin-
guish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of:  (1) competition 
between the owner of a famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of con-
fusion, mistake, or deception.  It also adds new subsection (c) to section 43 of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125, to create a federal cause of action “to protect 
famous marks from unauthorized uses that attempt to trade upon the goodwill 
and established renown of such marks and, thereby, dilute their distinctive qual-
ity.”  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125.  For examples of cases that have been litigated under 
the 1995 Act, see Dr. Seuss Enter. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1184 (9th Cir. 1997); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 
WAWA Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
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significant departure from state dilution laws.74  The federal 
act leaves the question of whether a mark is “famous” to the 
court, offering a list of six factors to consider:  (1) similarity 
of the marks; (2) similarity of the products covered by the 
marks; (3) sophistication of consumers; (4) predatory intent; 
(5) renown of the senior mark; and (6) renown of the junior 
mark.75 
B. Defenses to Trademark Infringement 
There are two types of defenses to trademark infringe-
ment charges.  The first defense is that the plaintiff has failed 
to prove that a likelihood of confusion exists—that use of a 
mark by another is unlikely to obfuscate the source of certain 
identified goods.76  The second defense includes “affirmative 
defenses,”77 which, when successful, preclude a plaintiff’s 
recovery even where the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood 
of confusion.78  This section discusses two affirmative de-
fenses:  fair use and free speech.79 
1. Fair Use 
Just as the importance of protecting intellectual property 
rights has evolved, so too has the role of trademarks.80  
 
74. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1030.  The Dilution Act’s legislative his-
tory reveals that the rationale for granting protection only to “famous” marks is 
to provide protection only to those marks most likely to be adversely affected by 
dilution.  MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 24.95. 
75. 15 U.S.C.A. 1125; Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1035 (Sweet, J., concur-
ring). 




79. An “affirmative defense” is defined as a “matter asserted by defendant 
which, assuming the complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to it.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990).  Other affirmative defenses that must be 
pleaded and proven by the defendant include:  laches, acquiescence and estop-
pel; abandonment; genericness; fraud; unclean hands; trademark misuse; and 
violation of the antitrust laws. KRANE, supra note 76, at 156. 
80. See Patricia K. Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic 
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While trademarks once merely identified product sources, 
many marks have become part of the products themselves.81  
When used in this manner, trademarks acquire certain func-
tional characteristics that are different from, and sometimes 
inconsistent with, their traditional role as source identifiers.82  
This phenomenon gave birth to the fair use doctrine of 
trademark law.83 
The fair use doctrine balances society’s interest in using 
words or images in their primary descriptive sense with a 
trademark owner’s right to exclusivity.84  Under the Lanham 
Act, fair and good faith use of another’s mark to describe a 
second comer’s goods or services, or the geographic origin 
                                                                                                                                  
Value of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297, 302 (1982). 
81. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960-61 
(1993) (listing, as examples of this phenomenon, “McDonald’s Treasure Adven-
ture,” a video game by Sega and McDonald’s and “Cool Spot,” a Sega Genesis 
video game where tiny bottles of 7-UP show up on the screen in order for the 
main character to regain vigor).  According to Judge Kozinski:  “Here a portion 
of a trademark—the big red dot that’s part of the 7-UP logo—had been turned 
into a separate commodity, totally distinct from its original and traditional func-
tion.  That’s an interesting transmutation, though not really an unusual one.”  Id. 
at 961. 
82. Id. at 962; see W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).  As 
the W.T. Rogers court explained:  
In an age when fashion-conscious consumers wear T-shirts emblazoned 
with the trademarks of consumer products and owners of Volkswagens 
buy conversion kits to enable them to put a Rolls Royce grille on their 
car, it is apparent that trade names, symbols, and design features often 
serve a dual purpose, one part of which is functional in the sense of 
making the product more attractive, and is distinct from identifying the 
manufacturer or his brand to the consumer. 
Id. at 340. 
83. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4).  Specifically, the Lanham Act states:  
[T]he use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is 
a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his 
own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such 
party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and 
in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or 
their geographic origin. 
Id.   
84. Id.; Car-Freshener Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d 
Cir. 1995); MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 11:45-:49 (“No one competitor can use 
trademark law to exclude others from use of a word in its primary, descriptive 
and non-trademark sense.”). 
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thereof, is an affirmative defense to trademark infringe-
ment.85  This fair use defense “allows a competitor to use an-
other’s registered trademark to describe aspects of one’s 
own goods.”86  Such instances are best understood as non-
trademark uses of a mark, to which infringement principles 
simply do not apply.87  As such, the fair use defense is avail-
able when the trademark’s use does not attempt to capitalize 
on consumer confusion or to appropriate the first product’s 
cachet for a different one.88 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church89 demon-
strates this principle.90  In Volkswagenwerk, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of another’s 
trademark to describe one’s services does not rise to the 
level of infringement if the use is not in a manner that tends 
to deceive the public.91  In Volkswagenwerk, a car repair shop 
used the name “Volkswagen” in a sign advertising its busi-
ness.92  The court recognized that it “would be difficult, if 
not impossible,” to avoid using the word “Volkswagen” or 
 
85. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4); see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. 
Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). 
86. Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1983); 
see Société Comptoir de L’Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alex-
ander’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1962). 
87. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307.  Similarly, in copyright law, video-
taping television shows for private home use does not implicate the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right to reproduction. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-51 (1984). 
88. Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1996). 
89. 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969). 
90. See also WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(holding that use of the words “Boston Marathon” to describe television cover-
age of the Boston Marathon is a fair one). 
91. Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 352.  For other examples of the fair use doc-
trine used as a defense to a trademark infringement, see Car-Freshener Corp. v. 
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995); Trippe Mfg. Co. v. American 
Power Conversion Corp., 46 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette 
Recorder Antitrust Litig., 11 F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1993); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. 
Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1127 (1994); and A.J. 
Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986). 
92. Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 351. 
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its abbreviation, “VW,” to signify the appellant’s cars.93  The 
court noted that the appellant could not use the mark in a 
manner likely to suggest to prospective customers that the 
two uses emanate from the same source.94 
As the Volkswagenwerk court explained, such use lies out-
side the boundaries of trademark law because it does not 
implicate the source-identification function of a trademark.95  
Furthermore, this manifestation does not imply the trade-
mark holder’s sponsorship or endorsement.96  Consequently, 
such use does not constitute unfair competition and is thus 
permissible.97 
2. The First Amendment 
Because intellectual property laws provide both incen-
tives for, and restrictions of, the public expression of ideas, it 
is not surprising that litigants have challenged particular 
applications of those laws as contrary to the First Amend-
ment guarantees of free speech and free press.98  Accord-
ingly, courts have recognized affirmative defenses of artistic 
and commercial speech to charges of trademark infringe-
ment. 
a. Artistic Speech 
The First Amendment stands as the primary constitu-
tional protection against government censorship.99  Courts 
 
93. Id. at 352. 
94. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Helms, 25 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); Yale 
& Towne Mfg. Co. v. Haber, 7 F. Supp. 791, 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1934)). 
95. Id.; see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
96. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 412. 
97. Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 352. 
98. CHISUM, supra note 58, § 1D[4]. 
99. Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); see John D. 
Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution:  Recognizing a First Amendment 
Right of Access to State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 401 (1993); Jessica M. 
Karner, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive Workforce, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 637, 652 (1995). 
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have unequivocally established that “[a]ny prior restraint on 
expression comes . . . with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its 
constitutional validity.”100  Thus, only where expression “is 
so dangerous to fundamental government interests” will a 
prior restraint be constitutionally justified.101 
The Constitution “looks beyond written or spoken words 
as mediums of expression.”102  If the First Amendment 
reached only expressions carrying a certain message, its pro-
tection would never reach the paintings of Jackson Pollock, 
the music of Arnold Schonberg, or the Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.103  While many have primarily valued the 
First Amendment’s role in preserving democracy,104 its fun-
damental purpose is to protect all forms of peaceful expres-
sion in its myriad of manifestations.105 
For example, in Bery v. City of New York,106 the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed that visual artists have 
 
100. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (quot-
ing Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968)); see also Nebraska Press 
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (holding that prior restraints are particu-
larly disfavored). 
101. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 275 (6th 
Cir. 1996); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). 
102. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Hur-
ley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345 
(1995)); see, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 
(1943); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 
U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Contemporary Arts Center v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743, 744 
(S.D. Ohio 1990). 
103. Bery, 97 F.3d at 694 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 
(1974) (per curiam)). 
104. Id.; see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“[E]ven advocacy of violation [of the law], however reprehensible 
morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls 
short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be 
immediately acted on.”). 
105. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (finding that ex-
pression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters 
may be entitled to full First Amendment protection). 
106. 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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full First Amendment protection for the sale of their works 
in public places.107  In Bery, the appellants, visual artists, 
moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of 
a New York City law108 baring visual artists from exhibiting, 
selling, or offering their work for sale in public places with-
out first obtaining a general vendors license.109  The Second 
Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling for the city, and 
noted that the lower court’s view of the First Amendment 
and of visual art itself was unduly restrictive:110 
Such myopic vision not only overlooks case law cen-
tral to First Amendment jurisprudence but funda-
mentally misperceives the essence of visual commu-
nication and artistic expression.  Visual art is as wide 
ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emo-
tions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, 
and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment pro-
tection. . . . The ideas and concepts embodied in vis-
ual art have the power to transcend . . . language limi-
tations and reach beyond a particular language group 
to both the educated and the illiterate. . . . One cannot 
look at Winslow Homer’s paintings on the Civil War 
without seeing, in his depictions of the boredom and 
hardship of the individual soldier, expressions of anti-
war sentiments, the idea that war is not heroic.111 
Thus, courts have granted visual art the same full First 
Amendment protection afforded to written language, as 
both are embodiments of the artist’s expression.112 
 
107. Id. 
108. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 20-452 (McKinney 1996). 
109. Bery, 97 F.3d at 692. 
110. Id. at 694. 
111. Id. at 692. 
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
ARTISTIC FREEDOM (1996). 
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b. Commercial Speech 
Visual art, or any form of expression, is afforded a differ-
ent degree of protection if it is commercial in nature.113 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,114 the Supreme Court held that commer-
cial speech may be “more durable” than other types of 
speech and that, as a result, “there is little likelihood of its 
being chilled by proper regulation.”115  The Court later ex-
plained that two features of commercial speech permit regu-
lation of its content:  first, commercial speakers are well-
situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages; and sec-
ond, commercial speech is not particularly susceptible to be-
ing crushed by overbroad regulation.116  These two ration-
ales have never been questioned, “as if further explication of 
these differences would be beneath the dignity of the 
Court.”117 
While the Supreme Court has explained that there are 
 
113. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  While 
commercial speech is a category of speech that receives less protection than other 
forms of speech, it is not wholly without protection. See San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 (1987) (“Com-
mercial speech ‘receives a limited form of First Amendment Protection.’”); Posa-
das de Puerto Rico Ass’n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 557, 562-63 
(1980).  The Supreme Court frames its decisions concerning restrictions on com-
mercial speech in terms of a four-part analysis.  See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
566 (formulating a four-part test to determine whether a restriction on commeri-
cal speech will be upheld, the Court looked to whether:  (1) the speech concerned 
a lawful activity and was not misleading; (2) the state government interest is 
substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances the government interest; and (4) 
the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to save that interest). 
114. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
115. Id. at 772 n.24. 
116. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pubic Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
564 n.6 (1980). 
117. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 
VA. L. REV. 627, 634 (1990).  The authors question the notion that it is easier to as-
certain the truth of commercial speech as not all commercial speech is objective, 
as well as the contention that durability should deem speech worthy of less pro-
tection. Id. 
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“commonsense differences” between commercial and non-
commercial speech,118 it has offered multiple definitions of 
what constitutes commercial speech.119  In Valentine v. 
Chrestensen,120 the first case in which the Supreme Court ap-
plied the commercial speech doctrine, the Court neither cited 
authority for its ruling that the speech at issue was commer-
cial, nor discussed the purposes underlying the First 
Amendment.121 
Similarly, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,122 the Court 
held that commercial speech falls under constitutional pro-
tection,123 yet offered little guidance for determining 
whether speech is commercial or not, focusing instead on 
distinguishing protected from unprotected commercial 
 
118. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see also Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977). 
119. William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer:  Some Cautionary 
Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1635 (1996); Michael W. Field, 
On Tap, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island:  Last Call for the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 57, 70 (1996).  When asked to define hard-
core pornography, Justice Stewart answered, “[I] could never succeed in intelli-
gibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Much of the same can be said of the Court’s ap-
proach to defining commercial speech. See Allan Tananbaum, “New and Im-
proved”:  Procedural Safeguards for Distinguishing Commercial from Noncommercial 
Speech, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1821, 1829 (1988); Steven Helle, Attorney Advertising Af-
ter Peel, 78 ILL. B.J. 543, 546 (1990) (“The dividing line between commercial and 
noncommercial speech is astonishingly fuzzy . . . especially given the importance 
of the distinction.”); Howell A. Burkhalter, Advertorial Advertising and the Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861 (1990) (“The ambiguous 
‘common sense’ standard prevents commercial speakers from knowing whether 
their speech will be protected by the court and discourages the distribution of 
important commercial information.”).  Id. at 867.  According to one pair of com-
mentators, “[i]n our experience, the more frequently common sense is invoked to 
support a proposition, the less likely it is to reflect common sense.” Kozinski & 
Banner, supra note 117, at 634 n.37. 
120. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
121. Justice Douglas later called the Chrestensen ruling “casual, almost off-
hand” and noted that it “has not survived reflection.” Cammarano v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas J., concurring). 
122. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
123. Id. at 762. 
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speech.124  Thus, from a mere footnote in the case emerged 
the Virginia Pharmacy test for defining commercial speech:  
whether the speech does “no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction.”125 
The Supreme Court proposed a second test for defining 
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission.126  Central Hudson, an electric util-
ity, challenged the New York Public Service Commission’s 
(“PSC”) order enjoining state electric utilities from promo-
tional advertising.127  Although the order was prompted by 
the 1973 energy crisis, the PSC continued its ban on advertis-
ing even after the shortage eased, in order “to stimulate the 
purchase of utility services.”128  The trial and appellate 
courts upheld the order on the grounds that commercial 
speech had little value when the speaker enjoyed a monop-
oly in its field.129  In reversing the lower courts’ rulings,130 
the Supreme Court defined commercial speech as “expres-
sion related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience”131 and found the utility’s advertisements to 
be commercial speech.132 
 
124. Id. at 773; see Michael E. Rosman, Ambiguity and the First Amendment:  
Some Thoughts on All-White Advertising, 61 TENN. L. REV. 289, 338-39 (1993). 
125.  Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); Arlen W. Lang-
vardt, Trademark Rights and First Amendment Wrongs:  Protecting the Former With-
out Committing the Latter, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 633, 643 (1993). 
126. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
127. Id. at 559.  The order was challenged in state court as an unconstitu-
tional restraint on commercial speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Id. at 560. 
128. Id. at 559. 
129. Id. at 560-61. 
130. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572. 
131. Id. at 561. 
132. Id.  This definition of commercial speech has been criticized as too 
flexible.  See Steven Helle, Attorney Advertising After Peel, 78 ILL. B.J. 543 (1990) 
(“[I]ts very indefiniteness and potentially all-encompassing scope easily could 
yield result-oriented conclusions.  Everything from a politician’s fund-raising 
speech to a minister’s call for tithing could be said to implicate economic inter-
ests.”). Id. at 547. 
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In sum, the Supreme Court has defined commercial 
speech as a very narrow category of expression:  that which 
proposes a commercial transaction (including commercial 
handbills,133 advertising of retail prices of alcoholic bever-
ages,134 “for sale” signs,135 advertising of prescription drug 
prices,136 and beer labels137), or is related solely to the eco-
nomic interest of the speaker and its audience (including ad-
vertising by electric utilities that promotes use of electric-
ity,138 or a trade magazine article that blatantly promotes 
product manufactured by author/manufacturer’s presi-
dent139). 
3. Reconciling the First Amendment to the Lanham  
 Act 
Because trademarks carry so much communicative 
freight, allowing trademark holders to restrict their use can 
implicate society’s interest in free and open communica-
tion.140  The grant to one person of the exclusive right to use 
a set of words or symbols in trade can collide with the free 
speech rights of others.141  The Lanham Act’s legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress was mindful of the act’s poten-
tial intrusion into expression protected by the First Amend-
ment.142 
 
133. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
134. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
135. Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
136. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Ctr.,  425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
137. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
138. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
139. Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1995). 
140. Yankee Publishing Inc. v. News Am. Publishing Corp., 809 F. Supp. 
267, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see Arlen W. Langvardt, Trademark Rights and First 
Amendment Wrongs:  Protecting the Former Without Committing the Latter, 83 
TRADEMARK REP. 633 (1993). 
141. Yankee Publishing, 809 F. Supp. at 275-76. 
142. Representative Kastenmeier stated:  “The proposed change in section 
[1125(a)] should not be read in any way to limit political speech, consumer or 
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In recent cases involving claims of trademark infringe-
ment, courts have provided defendants with greater latitude 
in using another’s mark or similar marks in the context of 
parody or other forms of artistic expression.143  For example, 
in Girl Scouts of America v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing 
Group, Inc.,144 the Southern District of New York held that 
the likelihood that consumers might be confused was not 
significant enough to overcome First Amendment con-
cerns.145  In this case, the appellants brought action against 
the author and publisher of a series of children’s books bear-
ing titles that allegedly infringed upon their registered 
trademarks.146  The court explained that a trademark owner 
does not possess a property right that is superior to the First 
Amendment rights accorded to artistic expression:  
The overwhelming consideration in balancing Plain-
tiffs’ Lanham Act trademark rights with Defendants’ 
interests is in preserving the public’s and Defendants’ 
First Amendment interests.  In considering the sub-
                                                                                                                                  
editorial comment, parodies, satires, or other constitutionally protected material 
. . . .” 135 CONG. REC. H1216-17 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989). 
143. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 
26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987) (editorial parody in High Society 
magazine of L.L. Bean’s seasonal catalog, consisting of nude models and fake 
products held not a violation of antidilution laws); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 
994 (2d Cir. 1989) (title of movie gave no indication that Rogers had endorsed the 
film and thus was not false advertising); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (parody ad showing “Poppin Fresh” and 
“Poppie Fresh” engaged in sexual intercourse was not trademark infringement); 
Girl Scouts of Am. v. Personality Posters Mfg., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 
(poster depicting pregnant woman in a Junior Girl Scout uniform would not con-
fuse the public as to its source). 
144. 808 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1477 (2d Cir. 1993). 
145. Id. at 1122. George Vetter & Christopher C. Roche, The First Amendment 
and the Artist—Part II, R.I. B.J., Apr. 1996, at 9, 39; see Yankee Publishing, Inc. v. 
News Am. Publishing, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 272, 275-79 (S.D.N.Y 1992); Dorean M. 
Koenig, Joe Camel and the First Amendment:  The Dark Side of Copyrighted and 
Trademark-Protected Icons, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 803, 837-38 (1994); see generally 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(suggesting that the First Amendment may trump any claim that the plaintiffs 
have for trademark infringement). 
146. Girl Scouts, 808 F. Supp. at 1114. 
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stantial evidence resulting from the parties’ com-
pleted discovery, this Court is unable to find that 
there is a likelihood of confusion between Plaintiffs’ 
protected trademarks and Defendants’ children books 
sufficient to overcome the First Amendment value of 
protecting creative works such as Defendants’ 
books.147 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit similarly 
noted the need for an analysis sensitive to the First Amend-
ment in evaluating a trademark claim that involves artistic 
expression.148  The court stated that, ordinarily, the use of a 
trademark to identify a commodity or a business is merely a 
form of commercial speech; however, in the area of artistic 
speech, enforcement of trademark rights carries a risk of in-
hibiting free expression.149  The court concluded that this 
risk demands limits on the extent to which trademark rights 
can and will be enforced. 
In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,150 the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit observed that trademark rights 
do not entitle the owner to quash the unauthorized use of a 
mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing 
points of view.151  In L.L. Bean, a trademark holder sought to 
enjoin the defendants from publishing a magazine contain-
ing a noncommercial parody of its trademark.152  The court 
found that enforcement of a trademark claim under Maine’s 
anti-dilution statute,153 a law substantially similar to the 
 
147. Id. at 1130. 
148. Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 
(1989). 
149. Id. at 48. 
150. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987). 
151. Id. at 29. 
152. Id. at 27. 
153. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1996).  Maine’s anti-dilution 
statute provides:  
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of a mark reg-
istered under this chapter . . . shall be a ground for injunctive relief 
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the 
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Lanham Act, to suppress noncommercial speech offended 
the First Amendment.154  The court explained that First 
Amendment concerns were tantamount because the maga-
zine had not used the mark either to identify or to market 
goods or services, but rather solely to identify the owner of 
the trademark as the object of its parody.155 
Thus, only when another’s trademark is used without 
permission for the sole purpose of identifying its source does  
trademark law prevail over the First Amendment.156  Free 
speech rights do not extend to labeling or advertising prod-
ucts in a manner that conflicts with the trademark rights of 
others.157  In such circumstances, the exclusive right guaran-
teed by trademark law is generally superior to the general 
free speech rights of others.158  When an unauthorized use of 
another’s mark is part of a communicative message and not 
a source identifier, however, the First Amendment is tanta-
mount to the trademark right.159 
                                                                                                                                  
absence of confusion as to the source of the goods or services. 
Id. 
154. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 33. (“The Constitution does not . . . permit the 
range of the anti-dilution statute to encompass the unauthorized use of a trade-
mark in a noncommercial setting such as an editorial or artistic context.”) (empha-
sis added). 
155. Id. at 32. 
156. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a); Kozinski, supra note 81, at 973; Tammi 
A. Gauthier, Fun & Profit:  When Commercial Parodies Constitute Copyright or 
Trademark Infringement, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 165, 172 (1993); Marla J. Kaplan, Antidilu-
tion Statutes and the First Amendment, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (1992); see Brach 
Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coalition for Chicago, 856 F. Supp. 
472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Yankee Publishing Inc. v. News Am. Publishing Corp., 
809 F. Supp. 267, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
157. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1184, 1187-88 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that the First Amendment is not a license to 
trammel on legally recognized intellectual property rights). 
158. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
159. Cliff’s Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 
886 F.2d 490 (1989); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 994. 
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4. New York Racing Authority v. Perlmutter 
Productions 
New York Racing Authority v. Perlmutter Productions160 
provides an excellent analysis of First Amendment and fair 
use defenses to claims of trademark infringement.  Perlmut-
ter involved Jeness Cortez, a well-known painter from up-
state New York, who had focused her artistic endeavors on 
the Saratoga Race Course for many years.161  Her paintings 
often contained New York Racing Authority’s (“NYRA”) 
registered trademarks, including NYRA banners hanging 
from the grandstand, complete with NYRA’s logo of a 
jockey on a horse.162  The NYRA claimed that it was entitled 
to monetary damages because its registered trademarks, in-
cluding the logo, appear in Cortez’ work.163 
Judge Fred Scullin of the Northern District of New York 
disagreed, holding that Cortez’ use of the images is pro-
tected under both the First Amendment and the fair use doc-
trine:  “Not only does the interest of free expression out-
weigh the interest of avoiding consumer confusion as to the 
source of products displaying these images, the evidence in 
the record shows that defendants use the images to describe 
Saratoga horse racing and not as an indication of source.”164 
In so holding, the Perlmutter court also explained that the 
First Amendment gave Cortez broad immunity for use of 
registered words and logos in the artist’s paintings of the 
 
160. 1996 WL 465298 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). 
161. Dale M. Crisafulli, NYRA Should Stop Picking on Cortez, TIMES UNION 
(Alb.), Aug. 5, 1995, at A6.  Instead of infringing on her artistic rights, NYRA 
should be thanking her for all of the priceless publicity she has brought to them 
many years.  Id.  The good will and positive advertising her work has generated 
for Saratoga and its racetrack would be impossible to repay.  Id. 
162. Perlmutter, 1996 WL 465298, at *1.  Cortez said that she “put that in as a 
little show of gratitude for their cooperation,” illustrating vividly that we live in 
a world where no good deed is likely to go unpunished. Dan Lynch, Welcome to 
the Dopey Place to Be, TIMES UNION (Alb.), Nov. 15, 1995, at B1. 
163. Perlmutter, 1996 WL 465298, at *2. 
164. Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
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Saratoga Race Course.165  Cortez’ decision to include 
NYRA’s registered marks in her artwork as they actually 
appear at the track, and the name “Saratoga” on a score-
board or the NYRA logo on a banner, “serves the artistically 
relevant purpose of accurately depicting that scene.”166  In 
such cases, “the interest of free expression weighs conclu-
sively in [the artist’s] favor for products displaying these 
paintings.”167 
The Perlmutter court was, however, more critical of the 
defendant’s fair use defense.168  In evaluating this claim, the 
court noted that the crucial issue under the fair use doctrine 
is whether the defendant is using the protected word or im-
age descriptively.169  The court found that, because the 
trademarked images in question were depicted where they 
did not actually exist in the scene portrayed, the use of the 
marks is not descriptive as required by the fair use doc-
trine.170  Therefore, the court denied a fair use defense for 
products displaying Cortez’ paintings. 
C. The Right of Publicity 
In many respects, the right of publicity functions like a 
trademark, in that it helps to identify the origin of the celeb-
rity’s services.171  The right of publicity is limited to “com-
 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at *4. 
167. Id. 
168. Perlmutter, 1996 WL 465298, at *6. 
169. Id. (citing Car-Freshener Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 
269 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
170. Id. 
171. See Nicholas J. Jollymore, Expiration of the Right of Publicity—When Sym-
bolic Names and Images Pass Into the Public Domain, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 125, 146 
(1994).  According to Professor Jollymore:  
In general, trademark law is an apt analogy for the right of publicity, 
since both bodies of law share a common purpose.  They both create a 
limited monopoly for the use of a mark (or persona).  Both are con-
cerned with the quality associated with a mark (or persona) and the di-
lution of the distinctiveness of the mark (or persona). 
Id. 
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mercial” uses of the celebrity’s name, likeness, or identity, 
which generally encompasses use in advertising, on mer-
chandise, or in promotion or selling.172  Thus, the right gen-
erally does not reach uses that are deemed “news,” “com-
mentary,” “entertainment,” “fiction or nonfiction,” and the 
like.173 
One pair of commentators have suggested that the fair 
use defense to trademark infringement is analogous to a de-
fense in right of publicity cases.174  They argue that as long as 
an individual’s public persona is used honestly and in a 
nondeceptive manner, others may utilize the persona for 
proper First Amendment or collateral use objectives.175  
Many courts have held that the First Amendment justifies 
the use, without consent, of a celebrity’s name or image.176 
The Second Circuit’s recent decision in Rogers v. Gri-
maldi177 illustrates this point.  In Rogers, Ginger Rogers sued 
the producer of a feature film entitled “Ginger and Fred” for 
 
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44-49 (1995). 
173. Id. § 47; see Benavidez v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102, 103 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (documentary film); Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, 498 F. 
Supp. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (magazine).  Professor Stephen Barnett explained 
the limits on the right of publicity as follows:  
[It] cannot be employed to prevent use of a celebrity’s name, picture, or 
identity in news reporting (even by the kind of ‘newspapers’ found at 
supermarket checkout stands), in jokes on television talk shows or ‘Sat-
urday Night Live,’ or in unauthorized ‘life stories’ of the celebrity on 
television or movie screens. 
Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in Advertising:  Some 
Counter-Points to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 594 
(1996). 
174. Armand Cifelli & Walter McMurray, The Right of Publicity—A Trademark 
Model for Its Temporal Scope, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 455, 467 (1984). 
175. Id. at 473-74. 
176. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Friends of 
Phil Gramm v. Americans for Phil Gramm in ‘84, 587 F. Supp. 769, 774 (E.D. Va. 
1984) (holding that First Amendment protects the use, without consent, of a can-
didate’s name in promotional campaign literature); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 
513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that First Amendment prohibits a 
celebrity’s estate from stopping a stage performance using the celebrity’s per-
sona if the performance contributes to society’s enrichment). 
177. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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violating her right of publicity.178  While the film told the 
story of two dancers who imitated Rogers and Fred Astaire 
and became known in Italy as “Ginger and Fred,”179 the di-
rector of the film stated that he chose the title of the film for 
its symbolic meaning.180  The court agreed with the director 
and held that Ginger Rogers’ right of publicity must bow to 
the superior interest in allowing her name to be used as a 
symbol to communicate ideas.181  The right of publicity ex-
pires and enters the public domain when the name or image 
of the celebrity involved has become a symbol.182 
II. ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME, INC. V. GENTILE 
PRODUCTIONS 
A. Facts 
The $92 million Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum 
was built to provide an educational facility to collect, exhibit, 
preserve, and interpret the history, art, and culture of rock 
and roll music.183  In 1991, the Museum commissioned I.M. 
Pei184 to design the building to be located in downtown 
Cleveland’s inner harbor area.185  A portion of the Museum’s 
 
178. Id. at 997. 
179. Id. at 996-97. 
180. Id. at 1001.  To the producer, Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire repre-
sented “a glamorous and care-free symbol of what American cinema represented 
during the harsh times which Italy experienced in the 1930s and 1940s.”  Id. 
181. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05. 
182. Id. 
183. Rock & Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 934 F. 
Supp. 868, 870 (N.D. Ohio 1996). 
184. Pei’s other works include the East Building of the National Gallery of 
Art in Washington, the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston, and the pyramid sec-
tion of the Louvre in Paris.  Benjamin Forgey, PBS’s “I.M. Pei”:  Just Another 
Pretty Facade, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at D1. 
185. The Museum contains one of Pei’s “trademark” pyramids, a 117-foot-
tall “tent” made of glass and steel, and a tower with cantilevered wings.  Karen 
D. Stein, Cleveland Rocks, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Nov. 30, 1995, at 82.  Museum de-
sign director Peter Arendt called it an “architectural, sculptural interpretation of 
the explosiveness of the music.” Museum of Rock Almost Lost its Famous Architect, 
STAR TRIB., July 20, 1995, at 10E.  But according to one commentator:  
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financing was obtained through government-issued tax-
exempt bonds, and the Museum is obligated to service the 
debt on a portion of those bonds.186  The Museum opened in 
September, 1995 with a spectacular “all-star concert” featur-
ing Bruce Springsteen, Chuck Berry, and Bob Dylan.187 
Like many of Pei’s creations, photographers throughout 
the world were drawn to the Museum’s architectural 
beauty.188  It was not unusual, therefore, that Chuck Gen-
tile—a widely-known commercial photographer who had 
been photographing Cleveland landmarks and selling them 
as posters for several years—would choose the Museum as 
the subject of his next work.189  Soon after the Museum 
opened, Gentile photographed the Museum against the 
backdrop of Lake Erie at sunset, “when the colors of the 
spectrum stretched up to fill the background.”190  Without 
consulting the Museum, Gentile transformed his picture into 
                                                                                                                                  
I would describe the shape in question as that of a warped storm door 
leaning against a refrigerator. . . . Even King Tut wouldn’t have said 
Tut-tut to Gentile’s camera.  But the pharaohs were as soft-hearted as 
the Little Sisters of the Poor compared to the emperors of America’s 
music dynasty. 
Dick Feagler, Rock Hall is Poster Child for the Power of Money, PLAIN DEALER, June 
10, 1996, at 2A. 
186. Rock and Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 870.  According to the Museum’s Presi-
dent, the project was financed both through public and private means. Rock N’ 
Roll Heaven Has its Own Price Tag, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 5, 1995, at 57.  About one-
half of the funding came from a bond sponsored by the Cleveland-Cuyahoga 
County Port Authority, and two local bonds and private sponsors provided the 
rest of the money. Id.  The bonds include a $12 million county general obligation 
issue, a $11.5 million city tax increment financing bond, and the $39 million Port 
Authority bond. Id. 
187. Dave Barry, 1995:  Over and Out, BALT. SUN, Dec. 31, 1995, at 6.  Since its 
opening, the Museum continues to expand. J. Freedom Du Lac, Rock Museum 
Rolling Out On Tour, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 1997, at 8.  In April of 1997, 
the Museum decided to take its show on the road for a tour in an effort to raise 
its profile and its visitor count. Id. 
188. MICHAEL CANNELL, I.M. PEI:  MANDARIN OF MODERNISM (1995); Withold 
Rybczynski, Rough Sketch of the Architect I.M. Pei, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 8, 1995, at 
B21. 
189. Rock & Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 871. 
190. Robyn Meredith, Rock Hall of Fame Asserts Ownership of Image, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 1996, at 12A. 
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a color poster, captioned “Rock ‘N Roll Hall of Fame,” which 
he sold in Cleveland frame shops.191  The photograph bears 
Gentile’s signature in the lower right corner and lists various 
attributions for those businesses involved in its produc-
tion.192  The print does not bear the Museum’s stylized logo 
of the glass pyramid building design that appears on offi-
cially licensed merchandise.193 
Unfortunately for Gentile, the poster raised more legal 
questions than money.194  Before Gentile sold his first poster, 
the Museum’s licensing department sent him a letter inform-
ing him that the building’s shape was protected under fed-
eral trademark law.195  The letter also alleged that commer-
cial use of the Museum’s trademarks was prohibited 
without approval and payment of royalties.196  The contro-
versy had begun. 
The Museum contended that its trademark rights in the 
name “ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME” and in its 
building design not only allowed it to prevent others from 
selling merchandise bearing the Museum’s trademarks, but 
also granted it a monopoly in all photographic images of the 
Museum.197  Essentially, the Museum maintained that its 
trademarks preclude publication and distribution of all pho-
tographs featuring the Museum that are not produced or au-
thorized by the plaintiffs themselves.198 
The Museum further claimed that the unauthorized use 
of its name and image diluted the value of its mark, a result 
 
191. Rock & Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 871. 
192. Appellant’s Brief at 3, Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759). 
193. Id. 
194. Meredith, supra note 190, at 12A.  One commentator explains that 
“[n]ews of [Gentile’s merchandise] reached the moguls of rock and dismayed 
them . . . [t]he idea of anybody but them making any money from the hall was 
intolerable.”  Dick Feagler, Rock Hall Horror Over Picture Show, PLAIN DEALER, 
May 9, 1997, at 2A. 
195. Appellant’s Brief at 3, Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 4; see also Feagler, supra note 194, at 2A. 
198. Appellant’s Brief at 4, Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759) 
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which made it more difficult for the Museum to sell official 
sponsorships and merchandise.199  Because monies from the 
license and merchandise agreements serve as operating in-
come for the Museum, it argued that “if the trademark port-
folio were put in jeopardy, it would adversely impact the 
success of the sponsorship program and the success of the 
merchandising program.”200  According to the Museum, any 
decline in revenues would make it difficult to repay the tax-
payer guaranteed bonds that financed its construction.201 
Consequently, the Museum filed a complaint against 
Gentile in the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.  
The Museum sought damages and injunctive relief for 
trademark infringement based on the publication and distri-
bution of Gentile’s photograph.202 
Gentile appeared at the hearing pro se and responded to 
these allegations by explaining that he had simply created a 
photograph that included the Museum and had accurately 
entitled it “Rock N’ Roll Hall of Fame—Cleveland.”203  He 
noted that the poster was his own “interpretation of the sky, 
the mood, the feelings of the night.”204  He argued that his 
decision to photograph a trademarked building falls beyond 
the Lanham Act’s reach and that his photo is protected 
speech which cannot be constitutionally enjoined.205  He 
pointed out that he stood on a public sidewalk when he took 
his photo.206  Additionally, Gentile told the court that he had 
 
199. Id. at 6. 
200. Id. at 7. 
201. Id. 
202. The Museum filed claims for relief under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1) (federal 
trademark infringement); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (false designation of origin and 
unlawful dilution of trademark); and OHIO REV. CODE § 4165.01 (Anderson 1996) 
(unfair competition and trademark infringement under Ohio state law). Id. at 4 
n.2. 
203. Appellee’s Brief at 9, Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 17. 
206. Dick Feagler, Rock Hall Horror Over Picture Show, PLAIN DEALER, May 9, 
1997, at 2A.  Gentile argued that, as a taxpayer, he was taking a picture of some-
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sought and received copyright protection of his photograph, 
and that, under Section 120 of the Copyright Act,207 Con-
gress specifically authorized pictorial representations of 
buildings like the Rock Hall which “are located in or ordi-
narily visible from a public place.”208 
B. The District Court 
After reviewing all relevant facts, District Judge George 
W. White found that the Museum had met its burden of 
proving a likelihood of confusion and therefore issued a pre-
liminary injunction against Gentile’s selling the posters.209  
The court held that the Lanham Act does not require a show-
ing of actual confusion when the plaintiff demonstrates evi-
dence that the defendant had actually copied a registered 
trademark.210  The court noted that, although the building 
design’s federal registration was currently pending, the Mu-
seum already owned a state trademark for that purpose211 
and had a federal trademark for the name, “ROCK AND 
ROLL HALL OF FAME.”212  In granting the order, Judge 
White held the Museum’s pyramidal shape was “unique and 
inherently distinctive” and thus a fanciful mark.213  The court 
                                                                                                                                  
thing that was partly his, not to mention that the Museum was partially built 
with public funds and its bonds were backed with tax money.  Id. 
207. 17 U.S.C.A. § 120 (West Supp. 1996).  Specifically, the Act states:  
Pictorial representations permitted.  The copyright in an architectural 
work that has been constructed does not include the right to prevent the 
making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photo-
graphs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in 
which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a 
public place. 
Id. 
208. Appellant’s Brief at 9, Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759). 
209. Rock & Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 873. 
210. Id. at 872 (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 
F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1987); DAP Prods., Inc. v. Color Tile Mfg., 821 F. Supp. 488 
(S.D. Ohio 1993)). 
211. Id. at 870. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 872 (citing White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating 
Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937)).  A fanciful 
mark is the strongest of marks, and thus, it is more likely that encroachment on 
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concluded that the Museum had met its burden of showing 
a likelihood of success in proving its claims.214 
The court presumed the presence of irreparable injury 
upon the showing of trademark infringement, as well as ir-
reparable damage of the plaintiff’s licensing program and 
revenues from continued infringement.215  In so finding, the 
court rejected Gentile’s argument that the preliminary in-
junction would deprive him of a First Amendment right to 
free speech; instead, the court determined that the poster se-
riously harmed the Museum by diluting its trademarks and 
by encouraging other potential infringers to do the same.216  
The court found this possibility of future harm outweighed 
the harm to Gentile, which the court determined was only 
the deprivation of his First Amendment right to free 
speech.217 
Finally, the court recognized that a preliminary injunc-
tion would protect the public interest,218 because Gentile’s 
infringement of the Museum’s trademark would likely con-
fuse the public as to its source of sponsorship.219  In addition, 
the court was concerned that the unauthorized use of the 
                                                                                                                                  
this mark will produce confusion. Rock and Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 872 (quoting Lit-
tle Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1987)); see 
supra notes 44-58 (discussing trademark protection for buildings). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. (citing Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 
651 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982)). 
216. Id. at 873. 
217. Id.  Specifically, the court noted:  
[D]efendants will be harmed by the fact that the sales of the infringing 
posters will be terminated.  Contrary to defendant’s contentions, how-
ever, a preliminary injunction will not deprive defendants of a First 
Amendment right to free speech.  The First Amendment does not ac-
cord protection to an ‘unauthorized reproduction of a trade name or 
mark.’  Moreover, as noted by the Supreme Court, for commercial 
speech to fall within the protection afforded by the First Amendment, it 
‘must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.’  As defendants’ 
poster is misleading as to its source of sponsorship it is not entitled to 
First Amendment protection. 
Rock and Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 872-73 (citations omitted). 
218. Id. at 873. 
219. Id. 
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trademark would irreparably damage the Museum’s licens-
ing program and revenues.220  This possible financial harm 
could eventually impact the public interest because taxpayer 
dollars may be required to repay the bonds.221  Thus, the 
court felt the public interest would best be served though a 
preliminary injunction.222 
III. ROCK AND ROLL WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED BECAUSE 
WORKS OF ART THAT CONTAIN TRADEMARKS OR BRAND-
NAMES DESERVE PROTECTION AS ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AND 
FREE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Artistic Works that Contain Trademarked Names or 
Images Should be Afforded the Fair Use Defense 
A trademark should not confer a monopoly that prevents 
others from copying something223—such protection from 
duplication is the function of copyright law.224  Rather, 
trademark law protects against the use by others of a word, 
name, symbol, or device in connection with the sale of goods 
or services that might mislead consumers as to the source of 
those goods or services.225  Consequently, a trademark 
 
220. Id. at 872. 
221. Id. at 873. 
222. Rock and Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 873. 
223. Rohm & Haas Co. v. C.P. Hall Co., 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155, 158 (1955) 
(noting that trademarks are the essence of competition and thus “rights in them 
may not be asserted broadly to stifle competition”).  Rather than granting a mo-
nopoly, trademark law recognizes “a fundamental right to compete through imi-
tation of a competitor’s product, which right can only be temporarily denied by 
the patent or copyright laws.”  Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 
1527, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995) (citing In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).  The sole exception is 
that deliberate copying of a trademark constitutes unfair competition under the 
Lanham Act.  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
224. Brunswick, 35 F.3d at 1350; see supra notes 25-29 (distinguishing patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights). 
225. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (defining trademark law 
and infringement). 
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owner may not prohibit all conceivable uses of its mark.226  
While the trademark owner does have an important prop-
erty interest in its marks, for a finding of infringement a de-
fendant must have utilized the mark as a trademark.227  
Thus, the use of a mark in its primary descriptive sense—not 
as an indicator of source—is not a trademark use of the mark 
and therefore, does not constitute an infringement of any of 
the trademark owner’s rights.228 
In the Rock and Roll decision, the district court’s decision 
to grant a preliminary injunction ignores the intent underly-
ing the Lanham Act.229  Charles Gentile is not a competitor of 
the Museum attempting to benefit from the Museum’s repu-
tation and goodwill.  He did not erect a copy of the building 
to deceive customers and thereby entice them to patronize 
his own museum.230  Gentile simply photographed a down-
town museum against a Lake Erie sunset and affixed a title 
to his photograph which described the photograph’s sub-
ject—the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in Cleveland.231  
Trademark law does not contemplate Gentile’s activity as in-
fringement, and a proper application would render his pho-
tograph fair use of the Museum’s trademarks.232 
Trademarks, slogans, and logos are particularly apt to fill 
in gaps in our language because they often describe prod-
ucts and services that are totally new and which are now 
commonly used, such as Xerox, Sanka, Kleenex, Band-Aid, 
 
226. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
228. Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 911 F.2d 363, 366 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (citing Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc.,  698 F.2d 786, 
791 (5th Cir. 1983)); Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 584 (2d Cir. 1990); see 
supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text (discussing the fair use doctrine). 
229. See supra notes 209-22 (discussing the district court’s decision). 
230. Had this been the case, White Tower and its progeny would justify a 
holding against Gentile. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
231. Rock & Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 934 F. 
Supp. 868, 870 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of 
fair use). 
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and Escalator.233  What originates as a trademark or slogan 
quickly transforms into a political campaign, a Saturday 
Night Live skit, a metaphor, a cultural phenomenon, an eve-
ryday expression, and occasionally even a fixed part of lan-
guage.234  Consequently, the originator of a trademark or 
logo cannot simply assert, “It’s mine, I own it, and you have 
to pay for it any time you use it.”235  Words and images do 
not enter discourse accidentally; they are generally placed 
there by well thought out campaigns intended to instill them 
into our consciousness.236  The originator of the symbol must 
give up some measure of control;237 he must understand that 
the symbol also belongs to the other minds who have re-
ceived and integrated it.238  As the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals explained in New Kids on the Block v. News America 
Publishing, Inc.:239 
With many well-known trademarks, such as Jell-O, 
Scotch tape and Kleenex, there are equally informa-
tive non-trademark words describing the products 
(gelatin, cellophane tape and facial tissue).  But some-
times there is no descriptive substitute, and a problem 
closely related to generity and descriptiveness is pre-
sented when many goods and services are effectively 
identifiable only by their trademarks.  For example, 
one might refer to the two-time world champions or 
the professional basketball team from Chicago, but 
it’s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to 
refer to the Chicago Bulls.  In such cases, use of the 
trademark does not imply sponsorship or endorse-
 
233. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks as Language in 
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 417 (1990). 
234. Kozinski, supra note 81, at 974 (“Looking back in recent history, for ex-
ample, ‘Where’s the Beef’ and Joe Isuzu are perhaps the only memorable aspects 
of the 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns.”). 




239. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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ment of the product because the mark is used only to 
describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.240 
The Lanham Act, while designed to afford protection to 
the trademark owner in the commercial realm, was never in-
tended to allow a trademark owner to travel beyond com-
mercial boundaries and use his trademark ownership to con-
trol the free speech rights of others.241  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Car-Freshener Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 
Inc.242 explained, “[i]t is a fundamental principle [that] al-
though trademark rights may be acquired in a word or im-
age with descriptive qualities, the acquisition of such rights 
will not prevent others from using the word or image in 
good faith in its descriptive sense, and not as a trade-
mark.”243 
In determining that Gentile’s use of the marks was in-
fringement,244 the district court overlooked trademark law’s 
key distinction between infringing uses and incidental, non-
trademark uses of a mark.245  Gentile did not use his photo-
graph of the Museum in the trademark sense to identify the 
source of the image, but rather in the descriptive sense, de-
picting in a striking and sophisticated manner what has be-
come a national landmark of urban architecture.  His poster 
simply employs the words “Rock and Roll Hall of Fame—
Cleveland,” and the photograph of the building itself in its 
primary descriptive sense to depict the appearance of a par-
ticular building (the Rock and Roll Museum) located in a 
 
240. Id. at 306. 
241. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and 
the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 157 (1992) (observing that the recent 
judicial trend toward recognizing new intellectual property rights “sometimes 
may interfere impermissibly with the autonomy of others and with efforts by in-
dividuals to achieve cultural self-determination”). 
242. 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995). 
243. Id.; see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 
12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 
196, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 923 F.2d 844 (1990). 
244. See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text. 
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particular place (Cleveland).246 
Courts are quick to equate value with right—to leap from 
recognizing that consumers attach value to trademarks and 
to conclude that trademark holders ought to have the right 
to “capture that value for themselves.”247  The originator of a 
new image is often perceived as its creator and thus seen as a 
victim if and when the image is appropriated.248  However, 
once the notion that images become encrusted with meaning 
is illuminated, the creator is not conclusively the purveyor as 
well.249  The public domain has been divested of symbols 
that, by virtue of shared cultural understandings, serve 
valuable linguistic and symbolic functions.250  Once symbols 
are introduced into a culture, they tend to be receded by 
those who see and hear them.251 
When the appropriator of another’s image or mark is an 
artist, it is wrong to assume that a freeriding scavenger—a 
mere poacher against whom trademark law protects—has 
infringed upon the rights of a hard working image maker.252  
 
246. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. 
247. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We 
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 124 (1996); see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United 
States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 
977 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Gordon, supra note 241, at 166-80 (criticiz-
ing the tendency of some courts to assume that “reaping and sowing” and “un-
just enrichment” automatically give rise to absolute claims, trumping all other 
considerations).  But see Door Sys. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., 83 F.3d 169, 173 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (“A trademark, even a registered one, is not a property right, like a 
copyright or a patent, but merely an identifier of source.”). 
248. Dreyfuss, supra note 247, at 140; see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property 
Right in Self-Expression:  Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual 
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
249. Dreyfuss, supra note 247, at 140. 
250. Id. 
251. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext:  Authorship and Audience “Re-
coding” Rights—Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, “Beyond Metaphor:  Copyright In-
fringement and the Fiction of the Work”, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 829 (1993); Rose-
mary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics:  Intellectual Property 
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1877 (1991) (discussing the 
concept of dialogism in society). 
252. Dreyfuss, supra note 247, at 141. 
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While artists who use trademarks are in a sense freeriding 
by utilizing images they have not themselves vested with 
meaning, the use of the image is merely incidental to the 
amount of creativity and effort that goes into the entire work 
itself.  In situations where an artist uses a pre-existing image 
or trademark in his art, this is hardly the case.253 
The Museum’s trademark infringement claim fails be-
cause Gentile’s use complies with the fair use exception of 
using a name to designate a geographical location:254  the 
Museum’s trademark is “ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF 
FAME,” whereas Gentile’s poster says “Rock N’ Roll Hall of 
Fame—Cleveland.”255  Gentile’s  reference to the Museum’s 
name merely confirms that it is indeed the Rock and Roll 
Museum shown in the photograph.  Gentile only refers to 
the words “Rock and Roll Hall of Fame” to the extent neces-
sary to identify it as the subject of the poster.  He does not 
use the Museum’s logo, which the Museum prominently 
places on its poster, or anything else that is not necessary to 
make the poster intelligible to consumers.256  Nor do the 
words “Rock and Roll Hall of Fame” stand out from the 
word “Cleveland,” as they might if Gentile were attempting 
 
253. In fact, the Museum’s argument that the money from licensing was 
necessary to pay back loans is weak:  “The $92 million Rock and Roll Hall on 
Cleveland’s lakefront actually had a ‘cost underrun,’ if there is such a thing.”  
Alan Johnson, Rock and Roll Hall Puts ‘Extra’ Money on Debt, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
May 15, 1996, at 4B.  Museum administrators decided to use four million dollars 
in leftover construction money to begin paying off $39 million in debt issued by 
the Cleveland-Cuyahoga County Port Authority. Id.  In fact, “[o]fficials expect to 
hit 900,000 visitors for 1996—its first full calendar year of operation.  A 1992 
study by the Deloitte & Touche accounting firm projected that the Museum 
needed at least 695,000 the first year to break even.”  Bill Lubinger, Rock Hall So 
Popular It Needs to Expand, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 19, 1996, at 1A. 
254. See, e.g., Schafer Co. v. Innco Management Corp., 797 F. Supp. 477, 481-
82 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff’d, 995 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that motel opera-
tor’s advertising billboards associating motel with “Border Exit” made fair use of 
the phrase, and, thus, did not infringe upon “South of the Border” trademark for 
theme-park home); see supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. 
256. Appellant’s Brief at 4, Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759); see supra notes 190-93 
and accompanying text. 
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to use them as a trademark.257  Thus, the Museum’s poster is 
clearly an official one, while Gentile’s is not. 
In a similar case, the First Circuit considered whether one 
could describe the “Boston Marathon” without using the 
words “Boston Marathon.”258  The court permitted a compet-
ing television station to use the words “Boston Marathon” to 
describe coverage of the Boston Marathon,259 stating, “[i]n 
technical trademark jargon, the use of words for descriptive 
purposes is called a ‘fair use,’ and the law usually permits it 
even if the words themselves also constitute a trademark.”260 
B. Artistic Works that Contain Trademarked Names or 
Images Should Be Afforded First Amendment Protection 
Because They Are not Commercial Speech 
In issuing a preliminary injunction against Gentile,261 the 
district court also failed to pay due homage to the artist’s 
First Amendment rights.262  For more than one hundred 
years, courts have recognized photographs as original works 
of art.263  Thus, Gentile’s work stands as pure artistic expres-
sion and should have been protected by the First Amend-
ment. 
A work of art that incorporates trademarks as part of its 
composition but that is made and sold for a profit may none-
theless be artistic expression and not commercial speech.264  
Consequently it may receive the strongest First Amendment 
protection.265  In previous Supreme Court cases in which the 
speech at issue contained both commercial and noncommer-
 
257. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. 
258. WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991). 
259. WCVB, 926 F.2d at 47. 
260. Id. at 46; see supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text. 
261. See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 99-139 and accompanying text. 
263. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); see su-
pra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra notes 99-139 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra notes 99-139 and accompanying text. 
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cial elements, the speaker had a commercial message to 
which he added noncommercial elements.266  With artwork 
or a film, the process is reversed; the artist has a noncom-
mercial message to which he adds commercial elements.267  
Thus, under the tests formulated by the Supreme Court that 
focus on the speaker,268 art that utilizes trademarks in its 
message is noncommercial and should be granted full First 
Amendment protection. 
The district court’s opinion supplies little information 
concerning the court’s determination that Gentile’s photo of 
the Museum at sunset constituted commercial speech as op-
posed to artistic expression.269  Apparently, the court sur-
mised that the photograph was considered commercial 
speech because Gentile took the photographs in the course of 
his livelihood as a photographer and ultimately offered the 
photograph for sale.270 
A work of art, much like a movie, may be driven by an 
economic motive.  However, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that books, movies, religious literature, and even po-
litical speech are dependent on generating money for their 
dissemination:271  “[i]t is well settled that a speaker’s rights 
are not lost merely because compensation is received; a 
speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to 
speak.”272  Without the possibility of financial rewards, it is 
unlikely that Gentile would have transformed his photo-
 
266. See supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text. 
267. Steven L. Snyder, Movies and Product Placement:  Is Hollywood Turning 
Films into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 321-22 (1992) (citations 
omitted). 
268. Valentine v. Cherestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942). 
269. See supra notes 209-22 and accompanying text. 
270. Rock & Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 870. 
271. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. 
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1955) (movies). 
272. Riley v. National Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988).  See Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964); Burke v. City of Charleston, 893 F. Supp. 589, 601 
(D.S.C. 1995). 
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graph into posters.  Furthermore, the type of art that Gentile 
creates is in fact a part of the message of his art.273  In selling 
his posters to local frame shops, he makes the art available to 
the public.274  The Second Circuit agreed with a similar ar-
gument made on behalf of visual artists who peddled their 
wares on the streets of New York City:275  “[a]rtists are part 
of the ‘real’ world; they struggle to make a living and inter-
act with their environments.  The sale of art in public places 
conveys these messages.”276 
Under the Court’s test for commercial speech, which asks 
whether the speech “does no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction,”277 using trademarks in art does not consti-
tute commercial speech.  Chuck Gentile is the speaker and 
the photograph is the dominant speech.  He is not directly 
affected if the viewers of his artwork visit the Museum.  
Gentile’s poster in no way advocates attendance to the Mu-
seum and thus does not even meet the threshold require-
ment of proposing a commercial transaction.278  In addition, 
the speech found in a work of art, however inundated with 
registered trademarks, is not in the format of an advertise-
ment.279  Furthermore, this type of speech does not refer to a 
single product.280  Any mention or showing of trademarks or 
products is secondary to the work of art or the mood de-
picted. 
Courts have long recognized that noncommercial, artistic 
expression that utilizes a trademark or trade name consti-
tutes protected speech.281  By erroneously analyzing Gen-
 
273. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
275. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996). 
276. Id. 
277. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-
tions Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
278. See supra notes 125-39 and accompanying text. 
279. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
280. Id. at 66-67. 
281. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
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tile’s photograph as “unprotected expression,” the court 
failed “to realize that it was engaging in a practice that under 
all but the most exceptional circumstances violates the Con-
stitution”—censoring the publication and distribution of 
constitutionally protected artistic expression.282 
Photographers insist that a poster deserves the same First 
Amendment protection as a newspaper photograph.283  In-
deed, the Museum acknowledges that pictures of the build-
ing published in newspapers are protected under the First 
Amendment.284  Because newspapers are published in order 
to make a profit, posters, another money making venture, 
should share the same protection.285  If a news photographer 
owns the right of self-expression in producing images, that 
same right should not be denied to a creator of images who 
employs paint and brush instead of a camera.286  Further-
more, assurances that the Museum does not intend to en-
force its trademark against editorial photography is not a 
guarantee as to future policies, let alone those of the rest of 
the world’s building owners, especially if the rules govern-
ing photographs are turned upside-down.287 
                                                                                                                                  
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989); 
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987). 
282. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
283. Robyn Meredith, Rock Hall of Fame Asserts Ownership of Image, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 1996, at 12A. 
284. Id. 
285. Whose Rock Is It?, CINCINNATI POST, June 24, 1996, at 6A.  One critic 
made the same argument on behalf of Cortez:  “If what Cortez does is thievery, 
then what are the photographs you see in the sports section of the newspaper?  If 
Cortez is a thief, then what about the guy who does the sports on WNYT (Chan-
nel 13) and shows you moving pictures from the track?”  Dan Lynch, Artist a 
Loser at the Track, TIMES UNION (Alb.), July 28, 1995, at B1. 
286. Dan Lynch, The Artless Dodgers of NYRA, TIMES UNION (Alb.), July 7, 
1996, at C1. 
287. See Don Luce, Counterpoint. . .Chuck Gentile and the Rock and Roll Hall of 
Fame, ASMP BULL., Oct. 1996, at 9.  Lynne Bryant, a member of the Executive of 
the British Association of Picture Libraries and Agencies and administrator of 
the Arcaid architectural picture library in London, England says, “Just imagine 
how many American-based corporations are here; if they adopt the practice of 
making a trademark in the shape of their buildings, all the rest will follow.  Who 
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C. The Rock and Roll Decision Fails to Balance the Lanham 
Act with First Amendment Concerns 
Courts have attempted to strike a balance between the 
freedom of artistic expression and the public’s right not to be 
misled.288  The Second Circuit defined the balancing process 
in Rogers v. Grimaldi:289  “We believe that in general the 
[Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works 
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confu-
sion outweighs the public interest in free expression.”290  The 
court scrutinized the trademark’s effect on protected speech 
and determined whether an important, overriding interest 
was served by allowing regulation of speech via enforce-
ment of a trademark owner’s rights.291 
1. The Likelihood of Confusion is Minimal 
The district court in Rock and Roll improperly presumed 
that a likelihood of confusion existed between Gentile’s 
poster and the Museum’s officially licensed products.292  In a 
recent Second Circuit case, Judge Leval found that “even if 
there was some confusion as to source or origin, it was rela-
tively minor and was far outweighed by First Amendment 
                                                                                                                                  
knows how far this might go once it has started?”  Id. 
288. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 
F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); 
see supra notes 140-59 and accompanying text. 
289. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
290. Id. at 999; see supra notes 140-59 and accompanying text. 
291. Id.; see Girl Scouts v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 
808 F. Supp. 1112, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1477 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 
central issue . . . is . . . whether the risk of confusion as to the source of Defen-
dants’ merchandise is greater than the public interest in artistic expression.”); 
International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nurs-
ing Ctr., 914 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Me.), aff’d, 103 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1996) (“When 
trademark laws are applied to noncommercial, communicative speech uses of a 
mark, a balancing test should be applied to determine whether or not they meet 
the requirements of the relatively strong First Amendment protection afforded 
such speech.”). 
292. Rock & Roll, 934 F. Supp. at 872; see supra notes 209-22 and accompany-
ing text. 
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considerations protecting the right of commentary and artis-
tic expression.”293  As courts have increasingly assumed that 
consumers are very unsophisticated when evaluating the 
consumer confusion requirement,294 confusion has come to 
serve as a rather minor impediment to according plenary 
control to purveyors of images.295 
Common sense dictates that consumers purchase a work 
of art such as the Gentile poster because it appeals to their 
individual tastes, not because the work has obtained some 
special approval from its subject.  There is nothing in the 
poster itself that would, in conjunction with the Museum’s 
marks, suggest that the Museum sponsored or endorsed 
Gentile’s poster.  In fact, his use of the word “Cleveland” in 
addition to the name of the Museum shows that he was only 
attempting to identify subject matter and geographical loca-
tion and that he did not use the name to indicate Museum 
endorsement or sponsorship of his poster.296  Perhaps 
trademark law itself should be amended to reflect the tenta-
tive draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Unfair 
Competition, which recommends that in cases involving ex-
pressions of noncommercial speech courts should require 
substantially more evidence of confusion to preserve the 
communicative message before imposing liability for in-
fringement.297 
 
293. Yankee Publishing Inc. v. News Am. Publishing Corp., 809 F. Supp. 
267, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see supra notes 140-59 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the sophistication 
of consumers as an element of trademark infringement). 
295. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We 
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 131; see, e.g., Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 
73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910) (“The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for 
the public—that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and 
the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are gov-
erned by appearances and general impressions.”). 
296. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. 
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. b, rep. n. b, at 
180. 
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2. Opening the Floodgates 
The trademark infringement suit against Gentile goes far 
beyond the Museum’s money-raising challenges.  If photog-
raphers must obtain the prior consent of the owners of every 
arguably distinctive building in the United States before 
photographing them for commercial purposes, architectural 
and location photography will effectively cease to exist.298  
Few, if any, publication photographers have the time or 
budget to seek such prior consent.299  The transaction costs of 
this process alone would be prohibitive for the vast majority 
of photographers.300  In addition, because the population of 
“distinctive,” and therefore arguably protectable, building 
designs is enormous and limited only by whether the owner 
of a particular building can prove that its design is, in fact, 
protectable as a trademark, a prudent photographer would 
simply have to assume that every privately-owned building 
having any aesthetic appeal is prohibited.301  The result will 
be that most buildings of interest to the public will be largely 
excluded from commercial photography.302 
Throughout the development of architectural and loca-
tion photography, publication photographers have never 
been required to obtain the consent of the owners of trade-
 
298. See Whose Rock Is It?, CINCINNATI POST, June 24, 1996, at 6A. 
299. Brief of Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 4, 
Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759).  The American Society of Media Photographers 
(“ASMP”) is the nation’s largest organization of publication photographers.  Id. 
at 1. 
300. Id. at 4. 
301. Id. 
302. As one commentator notes:  
If such a law stands, distinctive building owners might eventually 
charge photographers for shooting a city skyline, though the Cleveland 
Museum says it has no problem with being in a group shot.  Other or-
ganizations might, though.  To hobble the creativity of an artist out for a 
stroll is to rein in the spontaneity of street photography, already ham-
pered by release forms that must be signed to use pictures of people 
and private property.  Public spaces should remain free of such fine 
print. 
The Picture of Free Expression, B. GLOBE, June 22, 1996, at 14. 
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marked building designs before incorporating them into 
photographic images.303  Additionally, such a requirement 
conflicts with Congressional policy, reflected in the recently 
enacted Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 
1990.304  This affirmative right to photograph publicly acces-
sible buildings and to distribute and display those photo-
graphs freely, expressed as a limitation on the rights of archi-
tectural work copyright owners, was acknowledged in the 
House Report of the Copyright Act, the principal source of 
its legislative history.305  Furthermore, this exemption was 
intended to apply to photographs of buildings taken for both 
personal and commercial purposes.306  While the policies of 
trademark law differ from those of copyright law, the spe-
cific language and legislative history of section 120(a) of the 
Copyright Act reveal a Congressional determination that 
photographs of publicly accessible buildings should be 
freely taken and distributed for both personal and commer-
cial uses.307 
 
303. Brief of Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, Inc. at 4, Rock & Roll (No. 
96-3759). 
304. Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VII, 104 Stat. 5133, 8515-8516 (Dec. 1, 1990). 
305. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990).  The House Re-
port explained the rationale for this exemption as follows:  
Architecture is a public art form and is enjoyed as such.  Millions of 
people visit our cities every year and take back home photographs, 
posters, and other pictorial representations of prominent works of ar-
chitecture as a memory of their trip. . . . These uses do not interfere with 
the normal exploitation of architectural works.  Given the important 
public purpose served by these uses and the lack of harm to the copy-
right owner’s market, the Committee chose to provide an exemption, 
rather than to rely on the doctrine of fair use, which requires ad hoc de-
terminations. 
Id. at 22. 
306. Id. at 22 n.50 (deciding that an amendment prohibiting pictorial repre-
sentations made for the purpose of furthering the unauthorized design and con-
struction of a substantially similar architectural work might also interfere with 
scholarly and noncompetitive analysis of architectural work, and with the ability of 
photographers to pursue their livelihood.” Id. (emphasis added). 
307. See supra note 207 and accompanying text; Patty Gerstenblith, Architect 
as Artist:  Artists’ Rights and Historic Preservation, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431 
(1994). 
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Many photographers regularly include buildings and 
other works of architecture as integral parts of scenes shot 
on location.308  In many instances, photographs shot on loca-
tion for advertising or artistic purposes feature prominent 
landmarks such as the Empire State Building or Radio City 
Music Hall in New York, chosen as subjects both for their 
own aesthetic merit and their distinctive and recognizable 
character.309 
Furthermore, were trademarked images excluded from 
the artist’s potential use, artistic expression would suffer 
widespread stifling.310  Timothy J. Moore, Director of Com-
munications and Public Relations for the Museum, stated 
that his organization “has not and is not trying to prevent 
anyone from photographing the Museum building.”311  
Nonetheless, as one commentator retorts:  “Tell that to [a] 
prominent photographer. . . [who] reports that . . . he was 
making art photographs of the Museum from a public side-
walk [and] was confronted by a person who identified her-
self as a member of the Museum marketing staff and told 
 
308. For example, photographers such as Walker Evans, Lewis Hine, Beren-
ice Abbott, and Margaret Bourke-White captured the creation of the Chrysler 
Building (1930), the Empire State Building (1930), and the Rockerfeller Center, 
(1929-31). Lynn MacRitchie, Arts:  City that Reaches for the Stars:  New York Has 
Always Been an Inspiration for Artists, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at 11. 
309. Ironically, Cleveland, home to the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Mu-
seum, has been turned into a movie set for the upcoming film, “Telling Lies in 
America.”  Clint O’Connor, Telling Lies’ In Cleveland Filming of Eszterhas Opus 
Gives City a 24-Day Taste of Hollywood, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 1, 1996, at 1J.  Such 
Cleveland spots as the West Side Market, Grays Armory, the Cuyahoga County 
Courthouse and Ruthie and Moe’s Diner, were used to make the film.  Id.  Pro-
ducer Ben Myron reasoned that “[i]f we had tried to build a church set in Los 
Angeles, it would have cost $100,000.”  Id.  Instead, they had the opportunity to 
use St. Stephen. Id. 
310. According to one commentator:  
Perhaps an advertiser should be charged for filming a commercial at the 
Museum—using the place to sell a soft drink, for instance.  But a photo 
of a building is an image of a landmark, the product of free expression, 
not an assembly line. 
The Picture of Free Expression, B. GLOBE, June 22, 1996, at 14. 
311. Timothy J. Moore, Point . . . Chuck Gentile and the Rock and Roll Hall of 
Fame, ASMP BULL., Oct. 1996, at 8. 
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him that he was not allowed to photograph the building.”312 
On a video wall at the Museum, performances by artists 
including Bob Marley, Arrested Development, and Public 
Enemy are juxtaposed with footage depicting Jamaica, the 
Bronx, and South Central Los Angeles.313  The irony would 
be overwhelming were the same Museum that would not al-
low its trademarked image to be photographed for commer-
cial purposes similarly denied the right to utilize footage 
from these locations due to the implications from its own 
case. 
In addition, breakthroughs in digital technology are revo-
lutionizing the way filmmakers think about where to film 
movies.  With digital wizardry, filmmakers can make the ac-
tion appear in whatever location they desire without ever 
going there.314  If the Rock and Roll holding stands, it might 
cause more owners to register their buildings as trademarks, 
which would stifle the emerging use of computer-digital 
technologies and, in turn, the creativity of the motion picture 
industry. 
As the famous landscape photographer Ansel Adams 
once wrote:  “Photography is a way of telling what you feel 
about what you see.”315  Photographs are wise statements 
about the imprint humankind has made on the world; as 
pieces of art, they exhibit a clarity and formality of vision 
that is impressive.316  The role of the realist artist, including 
 
312. Luce, supra note 30, at 9. 
313. William Weathersby Jr., Rock and Roll Hall of Fame; Construction and De-
sign, TCI, Feb. 1996, at 38. 
314. Connie Benesch, Company Town Guided Imaging Is It Digital or Is It on 
Location?, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at D1.  Recent examples in the movie industry 
of invented locations by computer include the spaceship shots over major cities 
in “Independence Day”, Cincinnati’s historic Art Deco Union Terminal train sta-
tion in “Batman Forever,” and the Catholic church for scenes in “Primal Fear.”  
Id. 
315. John Kemp, Photos Use Scenes You’ve Seen, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 7, 1993, 
at 4H1. 
316. James Kaufmann, Photos are Wise Statements About our Imprint on Earth, 
STAR TRIB., June 7, 1992, at 14F. 
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realist photographers, is to pay attention, holding truth as a 
standard “amid the swirling confusions of life.”317 
The artist Robert Forbes commented that “[s]omeone 
once called my paintings ‘entertaining architecture,’ because 
I pick out many of the attractions across the country that 
have been designed by architects.  I accept that description, 
too, and find the search for such structures fascinating.”318  
In his quest to celebrate humanity, however, he too could 
face a trademark infringement suit similar to the one en-
countered by Chuck Gentile.319 
Artists and photographers who use familiar images such 
as buildings and brand-names reveal the manner in which 
they interpret the world.320  According to Richard Estes, one 
of the most renowned realist painters of the century, an im-
age that dominates the piece is “purely a visual experience,” 
while allowing figures or personalities to intrude “[allows 
people to] start relating to the figures, and it’s an emotional 
relationship.”321  Buildings and landmarks have always been 
the subject of artistic works.  For instance, the city of New 
York has been a place where the artist “comes, looks and de-
picts.”322  “Each artist views the metropolis with different 
 
317. Chris Waddington, Taking Realism to the Edge, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 3, 
1993, at L22. 
318. Betsy S. Goldman, Photo-Impressionism; Artist Robert Forbes Focuses on 
Light, AM. ARTIST, Aug. 1994, at 44. 
319. For example, Robert Forbes finds the Gateway Arch in St. Louis fasci-
nating and often includes it in his works as a prime example of a mechanical 
marvel of our time.  Id. 
320. Art; Seeing the City as Artists Do, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1987, at 26. 
321. Cathy Curtis, Candid Camera of Photorealist Painter Estes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 1991, at 33.  For additional articles discussing Richard Estes and the realism 
movement, see Kevin Lynch, This Art’s For Real, and Easy for the Eye, CAP. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 1994, at 1E; Paul Richard, The Hand that Plays Tricks on the Camera; Rich-
ard Estes’ Paintings Change the Way We Look at Real Life, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1979, 
at B1; Chuck Twardy, Realistic vs. Abstract:  Debate at the Heart of Art, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL TRIB., Jan. 28, 1990, at G1; John Kemp, Amateur a Pro at Photo-Realism, 
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 3, 1993, at 4H1. 
322. Richard F. Shepard, Seeing the Evolution of New York City Through Art-
ists’ Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1987, at 1.  Albert K. Baragwanath, senior curator 
emeritus of the Museum of the City of New York, observes that New York has 
   
1997] WHAT’S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE? 875 
eyes, and lucky New Yorkers have abundant opportunities 
to see these perceptions and match them with their own in 
the city’s Museums and galleries.”323 
Who could forget Andy Warhol’s simple image of the 
Campbell soup can?324  Artists are often fascinated by the 
over-abundance of, and the role society places on, brands in 
modern society.  In the grand tradition of movements like 
dadaism, realism, and post-impressionism, the use of images 
is a comment on society and on the role that we place on 
art.325  For example, Ken Keeley depicts New York City 
newsstands and scenes of Manhattan.  His canvasses place 
the viewer in Times Square, in front of various landmark 
stores and well-known restaurants, or on the streets of the 
                                                                                                                                  
been an object for the artist since its inception.  Id. 
323. Id.  In fact, Manhattan’s Whitney Museum of American Art recently 
produced an exhibition entitled “NYNY:  City of Ambition,” which included a 
range of artists’ interpretations in a variety of media, including paintings, prints, 
photographs, films, architecture, and fashions.  Joy Hakanson Colby, Exhibits:  
Take a Look at New York City Life Through the Eyes of Various Artists, DET. NEWS, 
July 3, 1996, at F10. Examples of the exhibits include Robert Moskowitz’s “Sky-
scraper,” Edward Hopper’s “Early Sunday Morning,” Samuel Halpert’s “Flatiron 
Building,” Red Grooms’ “Washington Square Park,” Lewis Hine’s “Empire State 
Building:  Construction,” and Mondrian’s “Broadway Boogie Woogie.” 
Many other cities’ sites in the United States have been the subject of paint-
ings and photographs.  See, e.g. Anne Behrens, Scenes of New York, Washington, 
WASH. POST, June 21, 1984, at 2 (store fronts and panoramic views of Washington, 
D.C.); Roger Hurlburt, Inspiration Beach—The Allure of Art Deco Buildings on Miami 
Beach Inspired an Artist to Stretch the Limits of Photo-Realism in his Watercolors, SUN-
SENTINEL FT. LAUDERDALE, Mar. 20, 1994, at 3D (scenes of Miami Beach); Suzanna 
Phelps-Fredette, City Buildings and Corners Turn Poetic in Young Artist’s Hands, 
COM. APPEAL, June 19, 1993, at C1 (details of architectural landscape of down-
town Memphis). 
324. John W. Smith, archivist of the Andy Warhol Museum in Pittsburgh, 
said Mr. Warhol “never got explicit permission for any of the commercial prod-
ucts that he painted,” including his famous portraits of the Campbell’s Soup 
cans.  Robyn Meredith, Rock Hall of Fame Asserts Ownership of Image, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 1996, at 12A.  On the other hand, Campbell’s saw Mr. Warhol’s silk-
screen paintings “as a wonderful free promotional device.” Id. 
325. For example, Ralph Goings painted a blue pickup truck parked behind 
a country pool hall with a Pepsi-Cola sign hanging above it. Karen Lipson, It’s 
Not Real, It’s Super-Realism, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1991, at 85.  When asked what it 
meant, Goings replied, “[i]t means that you are looking at a depiction of a not-so-
pretty pickup truck behind a not-so-pretty store.”  Id. 
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Big Apple.326  Keeley perceives his pictures as bits of Ameri-
cana, historical records that give viewers an accurate sense 
of a certain time and place.327 
D.  An Analogy to the Right of Publicity Demonstrates the 
Proper Standard for Using Trademarks in Artistic Works 
 The idea that the right of publicity is a limited one in 
the face of a possible monopoly provides an apt analogy for 
courts to review when a trademark is appropriated for artis-
tic expression.328  As with a celebrity’s name and image, the 
public should be granted the right to use a trademark as a 
symbol, which might include using it in a work of art.  Just 
as the celebrity loses the right to control her name, there is 
no interest in giving a trademark owner the power to control 
the uses of its name and image when not used for the intent 
of trademarks itself—to identify the origin of goods or ser-
vices.329 
Celebrity names, like trademarks and tradenames, are 
symbols which are part of our scheme of contemporary 
communication.330  Their name or image, as with a trade-
mark, has assumed the status of a symbol.331  Like the owner 
of a trademark, the celebrities themselves have invested time 
and energy in creating a “public persona.”332  While courts 
 
326. Ken Keeley (visited Nov. 1, 1996) <http://www.vivart. 
com/biographies/ken_keeley/>.  The final paintings are not just faithful transla-
tions of these images but reconstructions devised by the artist that always in-
clude some whimsical or private code.  Id.  In one of his newest paintings, 
“Truth, Justice, and the Comics,” the author counted over 50 brand name prod-
ucts used to portray the reality and life likeness of a city corner newsstand.  Id. 
327. Gary Schwan, Making Art News, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at 1J. 
328. See supra notes 171-82 and accompanying text. 
329. It is well established in the area of defamation that individuals lose 
substantial protection for their reputation as they become public figures.  See 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 486 U.S. 46, 50-52 (1988). 
330. See Nicholas J. Jollymore, Expiration of the Right of Publicity—When Sym-
bolic Names and Images Pass Into the Public Domain, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 125, 130 
(1994). 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 126. 
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have recognized that this effort should be rewarded by al-
lowing the celebrity to commercially exploit her name or im-
age,333 some courts have questioned whether it makes sense 
to give the celebrity a monopoly for the commercial exploita-
tion of her persona to the exclusion of the general public.334  
The consumers who purchase the celebrity’s product create 
significant value by collectively forming a market.335  The 
mass media also contribute value as they disseminate the ce-
lebrity’s name and image, creating the recognition which 
makes the public persona a thing of commercial value.336  
Courts have held that when public usage has actually given 
meaning to the name or image of a famous person, the right 
of publicity should give way to the public’s right to use the 
name or image as a symbol.337 
E. Proposed Standard 
While the above analysis might seem to permit every tak-
ing of trademarked names and images to further artistic ex-
 
333. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993); Presley’s Estate v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 
(D.N.J. 1981); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1090 (Cal. Sup. 
Ct. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). 
334. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), 
cert denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).  According to the Memphis Development court:  
Fame often is fortuitous and fleeting.  It always depends on the partici-
pation of the public in the creation of an image.  It usually depends on 
the communication of information about the famous person by the me-
dia.  The intangible and shifting nature of fame and celebrity status, the 
presence of widespread public and press participation and its creation, 
the unusual psychic rewards and income that often flow from it during 
life and the fact that it may be created by bad as well as good conduct 
combine to create serious reservations about making fame the perma-
nent right of a few individuals to the exclusion of the general public. 
Id. at 959; see also White, 971 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Bi-Rite Enters. 
v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1194-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
335. Nicholas J. Jollymore, Expiration of the Right of Publicity—When Symbolic 
Names and Images Pass Into the Public Domain, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 125, 126 (1994). 
336. Id. 
337. See Friends of Phil Gramm v. Americans for Phil Gramm in ‘84, 587 F. 
Supp. 769, 774 (E.D. Va. 1984); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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pression,  its application should be limited to photographs 
that are, in fact, artistically-oriented.  While a legal standard 
for what constitutes “art” is inherently unworkable as in the 
mind of the beholder, an acceptable standard may be de-
rived from another intellectual property regime—copyright 
law.  The threshold requirements for copyrightability appear 
in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.338  Under the Copy-
right Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress may 
make laws to protect the “writings” of authors, and this re-
quirement has been construed by the Supreme Court to 
mean any “physical rendering” of the fruits of the author’s 
creativity.339  However, because generally artistic works are 
usually fixed in a tangible meaning of expression, this pre-
requisite is not likely to present any difficulties. 
Originality is the second prerequisite for federal or statu-
tory copyright protection based upon the Copyright Clause’s 
provision for protection of authors’ writings.340  To qualify 
for copyright protection, a work must be original to the au-
thor.341  Original, as the term is used in the statute, means 
only that the work was independently created by the author, 
as opposed to copied from other works, and that it possesses 
at least some minimal degree of creativity.342  All that is 
needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that 
the author contributed something more than a “merely triv-
ial” variation, something recognizably “his own.”343  In 
evaluating those works that might meet this standard, Jus-
tice Holmes warned that “[i]t would be a dangerous under-
 
338. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West Supp. 1996).  Specifically, the Copyright Act 
provides:  “Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  Id. 
339. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
340. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.02 (3d ed. 1994). 
341. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547-49 
(1985). 
342. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
343. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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taking for persons trained only to the law to constitute them-
selves final judges of the worth or pictorial illustrations, out-
side of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”344 
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,345 the Supreme 
Court held for the first time that photographs could be con-
sidered original works of art.346  The Court found that:  
[The painting] is a useful, new, harmonious, charac-
teristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff made 
the same . . . entirely from his own original mental 
conception, to which he gave visible form by posing 
the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting 
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other vari-
ous accessories in said photograph, arranging the 
subject so as present graceful outlines, arranging and 
disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evok-
ing the desired expression, and from such disposition, 
arrangement or representation, made entirely by 
plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.347 
Chuck Gentile made similar decisions when producing 
his original work.  He visited the Museum several times be-
fore selecting the perfect shot, which, he decided, was just as 
the sun set on Lake Erie.348  In fact, the U.S. Copyright Office 
granted a copyright registration to Gentile for the photo-
graph.349  Thus, because the photograph was independently 
created by the author, Gentile, and there was at the very 
least a modest quantum of creativity, the artistic expression 
meets the standard of originality. 
Therefore, artistic works that contain previously trade-
marked names or images should be protected if they meet 
the prerequisites for copyright protection.  While copyright 
 
344. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
345. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
346. Id. at 57. 
347. Id. at 60. 
348. Appellant’s Brief at 3, Rock & Roll (No. 96-3759). 
349. Id. at 5. 
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laws exist to encourage creative persons to produce new 
matter, this requirement presents a narrow area in which 
admittedly independent efforts by an author are deemed too 
trivial or insignificant to warrant copyright protection and 
the rights that flow from it.  This modest standard will pre-
vent freeriding on the goodwill of the trademark owner.  
Works that cannot meet the originality standard should not 
be entitled to the fair use or First Amendment defenses, as 
these protections should only be afforded to further artistic 
expression at the expense of the trademark owner.  In addi-
tion, artistic expression will not be stifled by this standard 
because if the work cannot even meet the requirements of 
copyrightability, it does not meet the intent of the founding 
fathers for Congress “[t]o Promote the Progress of Sci-
ence . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the ex-
clusive Right to their . . . Writings . . . .”350 
CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property rights are not free; they are imposed 
at the expense of future creators and the public at large.351  
The rights given to a trademark owner should be limited in 
order to create richer public domain by allowing artists to 
build freely on the intellectual property of others.  If success-
ful, the legal action against Chuck Gentile could ultimately 
harm society in several ways.  By ignoring the basic purpose 
of trademark law, the Rock and Roll decision threatens to in-
 
350. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
351. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir.), cert 
denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  According to Judge Kozin-
ski:  
Where would we be if Charles Lindbergh had an exclusive right in the 
concept of a heroic solo aviator?  If Arthur Conan Doyle had gotten a 
copyright in the idea of the detective story, or Albert Einstein had pat-
ented the theory of relativity?  If every author and celebrity had been 
given the right to keep people from mocking them or their work?  
Surely this would have made the world poorer, not richer, culturally as 
well as economically. 
Id. 
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terfere with artistic expression and legitimate artistic com-
merce; it could make it impossible to depict a city skyline 
without obtaining entangling permissions and paying mone-
tary tribute to building owners.  With its potential to restrict 
the free flow of factual, educative, historical and artistic in-
formation to the public, the district court’s decision also 
threatens to create case law that could eventually harm the 
way we communicate through visual imagery. 
The current law ties the hands of commercial artists and 
designers, who cannot freely use images of buildings, brand 
names, or celebrities in their creative works offered for sale.  
Artists will be prevented from using some of the most pow-
erful and evocative symbols of our time, either because con-
sent will not be given or because it will be too difficult, fi-
nancially or logistically, to obtain it.  The idea that value 
should be wholly captured by purveyors or that anyone has 
the right to a marketplace purged of all sources of confusion, 
cannot be squared with intellectual property principles or 
with First Amendment values.  As one commentator postu-
lates:  
If an artist paints a street scene with a Pontiac in the 
corner, should General Motors be entitled to 15 per-
cent?  If Norman Rockwell were still alive and paint-
ing his images of the America that never was, could a 
newspaper depicted as a bit of backdrop in its image 
as the Bennington Banner was in one of his paintings 
demand its piece of the action?352 
Answers to the above should be a resounding “no,” as 
such uses are a fair use of trademarks and should be fully 
protected by the First Amendment.  Allowing Gentile to 
peddle his wares would be better for business and much 
more in tune with the freedom that underlies rock music.  
Indeed, “[i]f art is to nourish the roots of our culture, society 
must set the artist free to follow his vision wherever it takes 
 
352. Lynch, supra note 1, at B1. 
   




353. John F. Kennedy, In Praise of Robert Frost, Address at Amherst College 
(Oct. 27, 1963). 
